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Intergenerational Mobility and Schooling Decisions in 
Germany and Italy: The Impact of Secondary School Tracks
*
 
Intergenerational mobility in income and education is affected by the influence of parents on 
children’s school choices. Our focus is on the role played by different school systems in 
reducing or magnifying the impact of parents on children’s school choices and therefore on 
intergenerational mobility in general. We compare two apparently similar educational 
systems, Italy and Germany, to see how the common feature of separate tracks at 
Secondary School level may produce different impacts on children choices. Using data from 
a cross-country survey (PISA 2003), we study the impact of parental education on track 
choice, showing that the greater flexibility of the Italian system (where parents are free to 
choose the type of track) translates into greater dependence from parental background. 
These effects are reinforced when moving to post-secondary education, where the aspiration 
to go to college is affected not only by the school type but also (in the case of Italy only) by 
parental education. We then move to country-specific data sets (ISTAT 2001 for Italy and 
GSOEP 2001 and 2002 for Germany) to study the impact of family background on post-
secondary school choices: we find this impact is greatly reduced when we control for 
secondary school tracks. Overall, we estimate large asymmetries by gender, with women’s 
behavior more independent from family backgrounds than men’s behavior. 
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One of the most well known fact in the analysis of educational choices is that
parents matter. However there is less consensus about the channels responsible
for such in￿ uence. In a survey on children￿ s attainments, Haveman and Wolfe
(1995) conclude that parental choices play a fundamental role on children￿ s at-
tainment and that recent research on the US ￿nds much less mobility across
generations that once though. A ￿rst explanation may reside in early childhood
choices: Esping-Andersen (2004) shows that the impact of family backgrounds
attenuates in countries characterized by extensive pre-school day care. A second
partial explanation considers the possibility of borrowing constraints (Acemoglu
and Pischke 2001). However, the recent literature seems to exclude borrowing
constrains explanation as the main channel of the in￿ uence of parents on chil-
dren￿ s school choices even in countries, like the US, where the private cost of
schooling is high.1 The role of parental choices is even more intriguing when
considered in the European context, since most European countries, includ-
ing Italy and Germany, are characterized by supposedly quite homogenous and
egalitarian school system which nevertheless experience a low intergenerational
mobility in schooling.2
While there are several other potential links across generations that may
account for intergenerational persistence in education, in this paper we intro-
duce an additional possibility, based on the institutional design of educational
systems. An approach that studies in more details how institutional features of
the school system impact the transmission of parents￿decisions seems promising
when we consider that crucial choices about amount and type of education are
taken at a very di⁄erent age in di⁄erent educational systems. In comprehen-
sive secondary school system (such as the US and UK) the fundamental decision
about how much schooling to acquire is taken at the end of the secondary school
level when individuals are about 18/19 years old. Given their older age, they
are more likely to take decisions more independently from parental advice and
pressure. On the contrary, in many European countries (namely Austria, Bel-
gium, Germany, Italy, Ireland, the Netherlands, Slovakia, Spain and Turkey) a
very crucial decision, the secondary school track, is taken at a much younger
age (between 10 and 15 years old depending on the country). It seems quite
intuitive that an early decision is more likely to be in￿ uenced by parents than a
decision at a later stage in life, and therefore that a separate track system may
1For example, Keane and Wolpin 2001 show that even if borrowing constraints are esti-
mated to be binding, their main impact is on consumption behaviour and not on schooling
decision. Cameron and Heckman 1998 and 2001 estimate no impact of borrowing constraints
once measures of ability are controlled for. Finally, Cameron and Taber 2004 using an inno-
vative identi￿cation strategy also concludes that borrowing constraints are not important in
schooling decisions.
2See Dustmann 2004 and Schnepf 2002 for Germany; Checchi 2003 and Flabbi 2001 for
Italy. Using ECHP data, Comi 2004 provides estimates of intergenerational mobility in edu-
cational attainment, ￿nding that Italy exhibits a quite low level of mobility. On the contrary,
Chevalier, Denny and McMahon 2005 using IALS survey ranks Italy high in terms of intergen-
erational mobility in education, while Germany seems rather immobile. Unfortunately, Corak
2006 does not include Italy in international comparisons.
2lower intergenerational mobility in schooling.3 However, most of the impact
depends on how the tracks are organized and on how the allocation of students
to tracks is implemented.
In a recent paper, Hanushek and W￿￿ mann (2005) have reviewed cross-
country empirical evidence on the e⁄ect of the age of ￿rst selection into school
tracking, questioning a common view about the existence of a trade-o⁄between
equality and e¢ ciency. According to their di⁄erences-in-di⁄erences analysis,
countries characterized by early tracking exhibit greater inequality and lower
mean performance in students￿achievement tests, as measured at age 15. How-
ever, tracking can be based on di⁄erent observables (student ability, parental ed-
ucation, family wealth, or even race or religion), generating major consequences
in terms of (intertemporal) e¢ ciency. Using di⁄erent datasets, Brunello and
Checchi (2007) show that the size of the tracking system (as measured by the
age of the ￿rst selection into tracks and by the share of population attending vo-
cational schools) reinforces the impact of family background on both educational
choices (dropping out, attending college) and labour market outcomes (prob-
ability of employment, earnings), thus reinforcing intertemporal dependency.
If we consider intergenerational mobility as one dimension of intertemporal ef-
￿ciency (because more mobile societies are characterized by better allocation
of talent and/or higher intertemporal welfare - Dardanoni 1993), then di⁄er-
ent tracking systems can in principle be ranked according to their impact on
intergenerational mobility in educational levels.4
Following this idea, we analyze sorting over tracks generated in two countries
characterized by early tracking: Italy and Germany. The German educational
system sorts students into tracks at about age 10 (with some variation at L￿nder
level, while the Italian system at about age 14. While the institutional design of
the two systems is rather similar (actually the Italian one was heavily inspired
by Bismarck￿ s schooling reforms), the Italian system is formally more ￿ exible
than the German one.
As a ￿rst ￿nding, we con￿rm that the sorting rule is crucial to assess its
relative impact on intergenerational mobility. Despite the earlier age of selection,
we show that the educational career in Germany is less a⁄ected by parental
education than in Italy. We argue that this may explain why Germany is usually
ranked as a more mobile society than Italy in cross-country comparisons.5 As a
second ￿nding, we estimate strong gender asymmetries in Italy and small ones
in Germany. Moreover, the Italy-Germany di⁄erential is much more pronounced
on the male sample than on the female sample. As a third ￿nding, we estimate
3This is the claim put forward by Dustmann 2004 for Germany.
4In addition, di⁄erent degrees of intergenerational mobility in education are also correlated
with (across cohorts) inequality measures of educational attainments. Using data for the adult
population in 20 countries in the mid-nineties, Chevalier, Denny and McMahon (2005) show
that intergenerational mobility and education inequality are positively correlated: as long
as educational attainments of the sons are less dependent from the educational attainments
of the corresponding fathers, this greater equality of opportunities translates into reduced
di⁄erences in education within the same generation.
5See Grawe 2004 and Corak 2006. A direct comparison of Italy, US and Germany is in
Checchi 1997.
3that the impact of family background on post-secondary school choices is greatly
reduced when we control for secondary school tracks, in particular in Italy. Our
main conclusion is that we should not only focus on di⁄erences between early
and late tracking, as the previous literature has done, but also on the major
di⁄erences within early tracking systems. An e¢ cient early tracking system may
actually increase intergenerational mobility while an ine¢ cient early tracking
may strongly magnify intergenerational persistence in education.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we provide some
descriptive evidence on institutional di⁄erences between the school systems of
Germany and Italy. In section 3, we introduce a simple model: two polar cases
are considered, where student tracking is either based on perfectly observable
ability or on family background (as predictor for unobservable ability); some
implications in terms of e¢ ciency and mobility are derived. We present the main
empirical analysis in section 4, where we use microdata from a 2003 international
survey on students￿achievements coordinated by the OECD, the Programme
for International Student Assessment (PISA), to assess the impact of family
backgrounds on the tracks choice, comparing by gender and by country. In
section 5 we use the same data to estimate the impact of family background on
students￿aspirations to proceed further in education and we use a di⁄erent data
source (two nationally representative samples of secondary school graduates) to
evaluate the impact of parental education on actual tertiary school level choices.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Di⁄erent Educational Systems and Descrip-
tive Evidence
Figures 1 and 2 present the distribution by gender of literacy skills for 15-year
old young students surveyed in 2003 by the PISA assessment for Germany and
Italy.6 Both countries are characterized by a Secondary School system orga-
nized in separate tracks, which in principle should sort students according to
their academic or vocational orientation. As long as literacy and some basic
mathematical skills can be taken as proxies for individual cognitive abilities
that favours the acquisition of additional schooling (comprising both innate
ability and/or family in￿ uence in the early stage of child￿ s development)7, these
distributions suggest that sorting is far from perfect. However there are di⁄erent
degrees of ￿imperfection￿ : in Germany the sorting seems to be more e⁄ective,
6The Pisa (Programme for International Student Assessment) is a survey coordinated by
OECD and conducted by Canada Statistics (www.pisa.org). The ￿rst wave has been run in
2000 in 35 countries, while a second wave was run in 2003 in 48 countries. The aim of the
programme is the assessment of student skills (literacy, mathematical, scienti￿c knowledge
and problem solving) in a comparable way across countries.
7Cunha et al. 2005 claim that human capital investment exhibits both self-productivity
(skill attainment at one stage of the life cycle raises skill attainment at later stages of the life
cycle) and complementarity (early investment facilitates the productivity of later investment).
4even if there still is a large overlapping in the tails of the distributions, sug-
gesting that a signi￿cant share of students sorted in one type of schools would
have been indistinguishable from students in another type. In order to pro-
vide a quantitative assessment of the extent of overlapping, in Table 1 we have
computed the fraction of population belonging to the overlapping tails.
The comparison between the two countries indicates that the extent of over-
lapping is greater in Italy than in Germany: in Italy more than half on the
students in the academic and vocational schools have a comparable level of
ability as measured by these test scores, while this is true only for one forth of
the students in the German sample. This is an indication that the tracking sys-
tem as screening device based on ability works di⁄erently in the two countries.
We believe that understanding the main features of this type of sorting has
implications for the analysis of intergenerational mobility within each country.
As long as sorting at secondary school level is mainly driven by family observ-
able characteristics, intergenerational persistence is reinforced. On the contrary,
whenever school allocation screens students on their innate abilities, being capa-
ble of matching students to their most appropriate destinations, opportunities
for mobility are enhanced.
While Germany is considered the typical example of a separate track sys-
tem, less information is available about Italy. Starting from its earliest stages,
the educational system is organized as follows. Kindergarten starts at the age
of 3 and ends at the age of 6, and attendance is optional; it is organized and
￿nanced either by the central government or by local councils, and as a con-
sequence school quality can be very di⁄erent. Compulsory education ranges
from 6 to 15 year old, and includes primary school (from 6 to 11, called scuola
primaria), junior high (from 11 to 14, called scuola secondaria del primo ciclo)
and the initial year of upper secondary school (which lasts from 14 to 17 or 19,
depending on the chosen track).8 The upper secondary school (called scuola
secondaria del secondo ciclo) is currently under reform.9 Despite the existence
of di⁄erent tracks, the upper secondary school could be described (and in the
empirical analysis we follow this classi￿cation) as tripartite, with a an academic
oriented generalist education provided by high schools (5 years, called licei,
with further distinctions in humanities, scienti￿c activities, languages, pedagog-
ical sciences), a technical oriented education provided by technical schools (5
years, called istituti tecnici, with further di⁄erentiations) and a vocational train-
8Only starting from 1999 (law n. 9 20/01/1999), years of compulsory education have been
raised from 8 to 9, thus including 5 years of primary school, 3 years of junior high school
and the initial year of upper secondary school (obviously conditional on not being failed at
any point in the schooling career). The ￿scal law for 2007 has raised the ￿gure to 10 years,
but it is not yet known how it will be implemented. Anyhow transition rates at the end of
compulsory school age are currently above 90%.
9To be more precise, the system has undergone a wave of reforms and counter-reforms in
recent years: it was reformed in 2000 by the centre-left government, moving the compulsory
requirement at age 16 and unifying the initial two years (Legge quadro n.30 of 10/2/2000).
This has been modi￿ed in 2002 by the right-wing government in the opposite direction, low-
ering compulsory age to 15 and promoting the emergence of only two tracks, high schools
(including former technical schools) and vocational schools (called alternanza scuola-lavoro -
Legge quadro n.53 of 28/3/2003).
5ing o⁄ered by local schools organized at regional levels (3 years, called istituti di
formazione professionale). Until 1969, Italy was very similar to Germany with
only one track granting College admission, another track granting admission
only in a limited number of ￿elds and the remaining tracks preparing for spe-
ci￿c jobs (such as primary school teacher or construction site supervisor). The
current system is still characterized by many tracks (38), but now all of them
grant eligibility to College admission, conditioning on completing ￿ve years of
secondary schooling (even students from vocational schools could enrol if they
attend two integrative years). However, each of these tracks still predicts very
di⁄erent outcomes in terms of additional schooling acquired and labour market
performance. More than 88% of students who graduate from Licei enrol in
a University as opposed to 17.8% of the students coming from the vocational
track. The choice on the type of secondary school to be attended is typically
taken at the age of 13, during the ￿nal year of junior high school. Students
and their families receive counselling from teachers, in some cases supported
by psychologists, using students scores achieved during the compulsory school
as one the driving guidelines for orientation. Therefore we may consider the
Italian system a de facto early decision tracked system: despite the removal of
legal barriers to university admission, attendance of di⁄erent tracks has di⁄erent
implications for future educational career.
Also Germany is traditionally organized around three main tracks, even if
relatively recent changes, in particular at State level, have created additional
tracks. In the traditional system only students that graduate from one of the
three tracks, the Gymnasium, are directly eligible for University admission.
The decision of which track to enter is taken at the age of ten.10 Compulsory
schooling starts at age six with primary school (Grundschule). It generally
consists of 4 years of schooling in mixed-ability classes after which children are
divided into the three main secondary school tracks, (Hauptschule, Realschule
and Gymnasium). The Gymnasium or high school is the preferred school track
taken by the most academically-inclined children and prepares pupils with 8
or 9 years of education ending with the Abitur, which is the required degree to
enrol in university The Realschule or intermediate school is attended by children
with medium levels of assessed ability at primary school and lasts 6 years (5th
to 10th grade). Pupils with only low average academic achievement at the
primary school generally enrol in the Hauptschule, consisting of 5-6 years of
schooling.11 In more recent years there have been several attempts to introduce
comprehensive schools (as for example in Berlin area), but overall the system
remains separate. In Germany local educational authorities have more power
in orienting students￿choice: in some L￿nder parents are not entitled to choose
10We draw on Schnepf 2000 and Dustmann 2004 for a description of the German educational
system. One ha to bear in mind that the German educational system is not fully homoge-
nous, since the organization is state (L￿nder) speci￿c. We report what is indicated as the
￿prevailing￿pattern: see Eurydice 2002.
11In more recent years there have been several attempts to introduce comprehensive schools
(as for example in Berlin area), but overall the system remains separate. To see how we have
constructed our classi￿cation see the 7.
6a track di⁄erent than the one recommended, while in others they have to pass
through consultation before changing the choice.
As a consequence, we expect that the role of parental background being
more relevant in Italy than in Germany, given the greater freedom of choice
they can exert in the secondary school choice. Looking at the evidence obtain-
able from the PISA survey conducted in 2003 on 15-year-old students enrolled
in secondary school (see table A.2.a and A.2.b), the sorting provides apparently
similar outcomes: a little more than one third of students is allocated to acad-
emic track (41% in Italy and 34% in Germany), one third to technical schools,
that typically qualify for entrance in the labour market in white collar jobs (34%
in Italy and 36% in Germany) and the residual fraction is destined to vocational
schools. While PISA data set does not contain direct information on past school
performance, we obtain indirect evidence by observing whether a student has
already been failed at least one year. The fraction of 15-year-old students who
have been failed (probably due to scarce performance at previous stages) in
Italy is 19.4% in vocational schools, 10.9% in technical schools and 4.5% in high
schools, while comparable ￿gures for Germany are 28.5%, 17.2% and 5.7%. On
other dimensions the two samples look rather similar: the average performance
of students (that we take as proxy for unobservable abilities) in the two countries
is comprised in a standard deviation interval, and therefore Italian and German
students are indistinguishable in this respect. In terms of family background
information, parental education is similar, even if the fraction of at least one
graduate parent is lower in Italy, in accordance with aggregate evidence.12
In the sequel, we present a simple model where tracks choices can depend
on either ability (when observable) or family background (when ability is not
directly observable, and has to be inferred from parental education). Not sur-
prisingly, we show that when ability is perfectly observable, mismatch between
ability and school types is minimized, whereas (expected) total production is
maximized.
3 A simple model of school-track choice
To clarify the role of ability and parental background on school choice, we de-
velop a very simple non-overlapping generations model where the link across
generations is due to endogenous schooling decision and exogenous intergener-
ational transmission of ability. We assume there is an inherent persistence in
ability transmission between generations: this is the source of the fundamen-
tal identi￿cation problem we face in the empirical work since ability is also
positively correlated with education.
We consider two polar cases, depending on information available to par-
ents. In the ￿rst case, parents directly observe the realization of ability in their
children before choosing their school and, given our assumption about skill for-
mation, optimally select the type of school. Such behavior generates tracking
12The fraction of population aged 25-64 with a tertiary degree is 23% in Germany and 10%
in Italy (OECD 2004, Education at a glance, table A1.1).
7by ability in the sense that students are allocated in the track that generates
higher returns given their ability. In the second case, parents cannot observe
talent realization in their o⁄spring before making educational choices, and have
to make inference from their own endowment of ability, which is freely observ-
able once they have attended school. Therefore ex-post we will have a tracking
by family background in the sense that the exogenous persistence of ability is
endogenously magni￿ed by the schooling choice leading to mismatches between
ability and school track.
These two polar cases may constitute a metric to rank school systems since
eventually any school system tracks students. For example, a school system that
tracks individuals at a later age may get closer to a tracking by ability because
individuals have more time to reveal their ability. However, an early track-
ing system that puts e⁄ort, through incentive and learning, in implementing
tracking by ability may even be more successful because trough a more targeted
education and peers e⁄ects may increase learning and detect mismatches earlier.
The model consists of three elements that describe the information set, the
choice variables and the outcome variables. These three elements are the descrip-
tion of individual ability, the schooling/track decision and the labour market.
The link between generations is the transmission of ability and information and
the schooling choice.
We model ability and its intergenerational transmission following Checchi,
Ichino and Rustichini 1999. Ability is de￿ned as a realization from two types of
ability:
a 2 fH;Lg
and its intergenerational transmission follows a ￿rst-order Markov process:
Son
L H
Father L ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
H (1 ￿ ￿) ￿
with 1=2 < ￿ < 1: Persistency in abilities (￿ > 1=2) is motivated by both nature
(genetic) and nurture because in the empirical speci￿cation we will observe
ability when children are about 15 years old and therefore already socialized.
Schooling is divided in two tracks:
￿ 2 fA;V g
and the choice of a track is the only choice variable. Schooling is essentially
a production function that transforms ability in skills. Skills will then have
returns in the labor market.
Ability and track can be matched di⁄erently. The di⁄erent probability of
success in acquiring skills ￿ij determines which match (a;￿) is better, i.e. the
ability type H is a better match for the A track because ￿AH > ￿AL while
the ability type L is a better match for the V track because ￿V L > ￿V H.13
13Note that ￿probability of success￿here does not simply mean to complete schooling but
it means to actually acquire the skills.
8This is a very simple way to capture some multi-dimensionality in the notion of
ability: there is not a single ability that allows individual to perform better in
any ￿eld but some abilities are better in certain ￿eld (H is better in the A track)
while others are better in other ￿elds (L is better in the V track). The track A
guarantees an higher ￿ quantity￿of skill (sA > sV ) - that may be interpreted as
well as more years of schooling - but at an higher cost k > 0. There are rational
expectations, therefore the realized proportion of success in the population are
equal to the expected probabilities. When unsuccessful, no skill is acquired.
From this setting we get the following expectation over skill acquisition:
E (skilljA;a) = sA￿Aa ￿ k
E (skilljV;a) = sV ￿V a
The labour market is very simple and describes a standard human capital
model where skills (or years of schooling) have a positive return determining the
following wages:
w = rsA;V
Note that if no skills are acquired (which occurs with probability (1 ￿ ￿￿a)),
the wage is (normalized to) zero.
3.1 Case 1: Tracking by Ability
If ability is perfectly observed when choosing ￿ the decision problem is:
Choose ￿ 2 fA;V g to maximize E (wja)
The optimal decision rule can be described as follows. If the child has ability
a = H, then it will be optimal to choose the academic track, ￿ = A; if and only
if:
E (wjA;H) > E (wjV;H)
rsA￿AH ￿ rk > rsV ￿V H
Therefore all parents with child￿ s endowment a = H will choose the A track if
the cost di⁄erential is low enough:
k < sA￿AH ￿ sV ￿V H ￿ k￿
1
If the child is has ability a = L, then it will be optimal to choose the
vocational track, ￿ = V when:
E (wjV;L) > E (wjA;L)
rsV ￿V L > rsA￿AL ￿ rk
therefore all parents with child￿ s endowment a = L will choose the V track if
the cost di⁄erential is high enough:
k > sA￿AL ￿ sV ￿V L ￿ k￿￿
1
Note that by de￿nition of the match ability/track we obtain the following.








1 = sA￿AH ￿ sV ￿V H ￿ (sA￿AL ￿ sV ￿V L)
= sA (￿AH ￿ ￿AL) + sV (￿V L ￿ ￿V H) > 0
since ￿AH > ￿AL and ￿V L > ￿V H:
Therefore we obtain one region of attendance costs that determines a sepa-
rating equilibrium and two regions that determine a pooling equilibrium. The
following de￿nition summarizes these results.
De￿nition 2 Equilibrium:
￿ if k￿￿
1 < k < k￿
1 a separating equilibrium where all a = H choose track A
and all a = L choose track V is realized. Total (net) expected production
in each period t is equal to:
Wt (1) = rsV ￿V LLt + (rsA￿AH ￿ rk)Ht
￿ if k < k￿￿
1 a pooling equilibrium where all a 2 fH;Lg choose track A is
realized. Total (net) expected production in each period t is equal to:
Wt (1) = rsA (￿ALLt + ￿AHHt) ￿ rk(Lt + Ht)
￿ if k￿
1 < k a pooling equilibrium where all a 2 fH;Lg choose track V is
realized. Total (net) expected production in each period t is equal to:
Wt (1) = rsV (￿V LLt + ￿V HHt)
Of course, none of these equilibria is ine¢ cient in the sense that, conditioning
on the exogenous cost of schooling, no Pareto improvement is present. Moreover,
for su¢ ciently low or su¢ ciently high costs tracks basically disappear. However,
in a situation of intermediate costs, tracks are a way to realize e¢ cient sorting
in the sense that di⁄erent types of ability are revealed by not requiring the
acquisition of the same amount of schooling. We look at this intermediate
range of costs as the most likely to approximate the empirical data. In such a
context an "e¢ cient match" is a match of H ability individuals to the A track
and L ability individuals to the V track. This is exactly the equilibrium realized
under perfect information.
Total production in steady state is easily obtained because the ergodic dis-
tribution is H = L = 0:5 of the measure one of individuals. In this respect an
interesting remark is that there is not an optimal ￿ in the separating equilib-
rium case. This is shown by noticing that in steady state distribution an equal




[(sA￿AH ￿ k) + sV ￿V L]
with k￿
1 > k > k
￿￿
1
which is independent from ￿: under perfect information ￿ plays a role only in
the transition of abilities. Since however the type of school is optimally selected
for all individuals, the possibility of failure in acquiring skill is independent of
the degree of intergenerational persistence.
3.2 Case 2: Tracking by Family Background
Now assume that ability is not perfectly observed when choosing ￿ but that
the information set includes wages and ￿ choices of the previous generation
together with full information of the Markov process. From this information
set the parent predicts the type of her own child and her expected wages. The
problem will then be:
Choose ￿ 2 fA;V g to maximize E (wjat￿1)
Suppose we start from a separating equilibrium: if this is the case, knowing
the school choice of the previous generation means knowing parent￿ s ability with
probability one. Therefore the optimal decision rule will be
If at￿1 = H, choose ￿ = A when:
Et (wjA;at￿1 = H) > Et (wjV;at￿1 = H)
￿ (rsA￿AH ￿ rk) + (1 ￿ ￿)(rsA￿AL ￿ rk) > ￿rsV ￿V H + (1 ￿ ￿)rsV ￿V L
therefore all the parent H will choose the A track for their children if the cost
di⁄erential is low enough:
k < sA [￿￿AH + (1 ￿ ￿)￿AL] ￿ sV [￿￿V H + (1 ￿ ￿)￿V L] ￿ k￿
2
If at￿1 = L, choose ￿ = V when:
Et (wjV;at￿1 = L) > Et (wjA;at￿1 = L)
￿rsV ￿V L + (1 ￿ ￿)rsV ￿V H > ￿ [rsA￿AL ￿ rk] + (1 ￿ ￿)[rsA￿AH ￿ rk]
therefore all the parents L will choose the V track for their children if the cost
di⁄erential is high enough:
k > sA [￿￿AL + (1 ￿ ￿)￿AH] ￿ sV [￿￿V L + (1 ￿ ￿)￿V H] ￿ k￿￿
2
Again, from the de￿nition of the match ability/track we can obtain the
following.





11Proof. Again the statement is proved by the ratios of the probabilities of success




sA [￿￿AH + (1 ￿ ￿)￿AL ￿ ￿￿AL ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿AH]
> sV [￿￿HV + (1 ￿ ￿)￿LV ￿ ￿￿LV ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿HV ]
LHS = sA (2￿ ￿ 1)[￿AH ￿ ￿AL] > 0
RHS = sV (2￿ ￿ 1)[￿V H ￿ ￿V L] < 0
Therefore we obtain the same structure of equilibrium de￿ned in the ￿rst
case: for low costs all types choose the A track, for high costs all types choose
the V track and for intermediate costs they sort between the two tracks but less
e¢ ciently than in the ￿rst case because ability is not known at the moment of
the choice. The following de￿nition summarizes these results.
De￿nition 4 Equilibrium:
￿ if k￿￿
2 < k < k￿
2 a separating equilibrium where all at￿1 = H choose
track A and all at￿1 = L choose track V is realized. Total (net) expected
production in each period t is equal to:
Wt (2) = rsV ￿V L [￿Lt + (1 ￿ ￿)Ht] + (rsA￿AH ￿ rk)[(1 ￿ ￿)Lt + ￿Ht]
￿ if k < k￿￿
2 a pooling equilibrium where all at￿1 2 fH;Lg choose track A is
realized. Total (net) expected production in each period t is equal to:
Wt (2) = rsA (￿ALLt + ￿AHHt) ￿ rk(Lt + Ht)
￿ if k￿
2 < k a pooling equilibrium where all at￿1 2 fH;Lg choose track V is
realized. Total (net) expected production in each period t is equal to:
Wt (2) = rsV (￿V LLt + ￿V HHt)
As a ￿rst step to compare this equilibrium with the previous equilibrium, it
is interesting to ask whether the set of costs generating a separating equilibrium
under imperfect information is larger or smaller than the set of costs under
perfect information. As expected, the set of costs under imperfect information
is smaller as proved in the following.
Lemma 5 The set of cost such that a separating equilibrium is realized is










sA￿AH ￿ sV ￿V H > sA [￿￿AH + (1 ￿ ￿)￿AL] ￿ sV [￿￿HV + (1 ￿ ￿)￿LV ]
sA (1 ￿ ￿)[￿AH ￿ ￿AL] > 0 > sV (1 ￿ ￿)[￿V H ￿ ￿V L]




sA￿AL ￿ sV ￿V L < sA [￿￿AL + (1 ￿ ￿)￿AH] ￿ sV [￿￿V L + (1 ￿ ￿)￿V H]
sV (1 ￿ ￿)[￿V H ￿ ￿V L] < 0 < sA (1 ￿ ￿)[￿AH ￿ ￿AL]
We can now rank the equilibria under ability sorting and under family back-
ground sorting by looking at total net production and at the amount of mis-









1> k > k
￿
2 (k￿
1 ￿ k)Ht> 0
k￿
2> k > k
￿￿
2 (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
[rsV ￿V L ￿ (rsA￿AH ￿ rk)]Lt




2 > k > k
￿￿
1 (k ￿ k￿￿
1 )Lt> 0
k￿￿
1 > k 0
If the cost is very high (￿rst row), the V track is too expensive for any
type and every individuals will choose the V track independently of information
and ability type. If the cost is lower (second row) knowledge of your own
ability allows more e¢ cient choices, i.e. a separating equilibrium emerges under
perfect information but it does not under imperfect information. That is why the
di⁄erential is proportional to the proportion of H ability type in the population
and to the distance of the actual cost from the threshold cost k￿
1. If the cost
is lowered further, we enter in an area where both ability sorting and family
background sorting generate a separating equilibrium (third row). However,
the sorting under family background is less e¢ cient generating the following
mismatch: a proportion (1 ￿ ￿) of H ability individuals choose the V track
while the A track would have been more productive for them and, conversely, a
proportion (1 ￿ ￿) of L ability individuals choose the A track instead of the V
track. This mismatch generates a di⁄erential that is proportional to the cost of
choosing the "wrong" track (the two terms in squared parentheses) weighted by
the proportion of the ability type making the mistake (L-type in the ￿rst case
and H-type in the second case). Since under incomplete information parents
infer the child￿ s type from their own type, the di⁄erential is also proportional to
the parameter of intergenerational persistency in ability (￿). If the cost is lower
13(fourth row) the gain in sorting by ability is again given by mismatch: under
sorting by family background all individuals choose the A track while for ability
L individuals the V track would have been better. Finally, if cost are very low
(last row), there is no mismatch and all individuals choose the A track in both
environments.
Another couple of remarks derived from the model are the following.
In the limiting case ￿ = 1=2 individuals cannot infer any information on their
own type from their parent￿ s type. As expected following from this intuition,
there is no separating equilibrium and one of the two pooling equilibrium will





sA (￿AH + ￿AL) ￿
1
2
sV (￿HV + ￿LV )
Therefore, for costs higher than k all individuals will choose the vocational track
and for cost lower than k all individuals will choose the academic track.
The second remark concerns the steady state, since the two environments,
sorting by ability and sorting by family backgrounds, do not converge in steady
state. In the most interesting region, i.e. for costs generating a separating
equilibrium in both cases, the di⁄erential will be:




fsA (1 ￿ ￿)[￿AH ￿ ￿AL] + sV (1 ￿ ￿)[￿V L ￿ ￿V H]g > 0
with k￿
2 > k > k
￿￿
2
again due to the mismatch of individuals in wrong tracks in the incomplete
information case.
In conclusion, our simple model shows that when sorting by ability is possi-
ble, e¢ cient allocation is achieved and output is maximized. On the contrary,
under imperfect information on ability, tracking is based on parental education
(due to inference on parental abilities), there is misallocation (i.e. a positive
proportion of individuals are making choices that ex-post are revealed wrong
with respect to their true abilities ending up in a bad (a;￿) match) and output
is reduced.
The empirical implications we draw from the model are as follows. In the
previous section we have shown that data for Italy and Germany generate mis-
allocation of individuals over tracks. Moreover, the amount of misallocation is
higher in Italy than in Germany. We interpret this evidence as the result of Ger-
many being closer than Italy to the notion of tracking on ability. As empirical
implication from the present model, we should therefore ￿nd stronger impact
of family background in Italy than in Germany. The following two sections are
devoted to study this impact. We thus analyze the impact of some measures of
family background and some proxies for ability onto three choice variables: the
type of secondary school attended; the attitudes toward acquiring additional ed-
ucation after completing the secondary school level; and the actual choices made
after completing the secondary school level. Our results suggest that despite its
14apparent greater ￿ exibility (parents are free to choose the type of secondary, en-
rolment at university is independent of the type of secondary school attended)
the Italian educational system is less e⁄ective in sorting students according to
their ability when compared to the German one.
4 Impact of Family Background on Secondary
Schooling
4.1 Empirical Speci￿cation
Estimation of the determinants of the choice of the Secondary School track
requires at least three sets of variables. First, we need a dependent variable that
includes not simply the usual information about the schooling level completed
but also a disaggregation by type of schooling tracks. Second, we need a measure
of family background and in particular of the cultural background. Third, on
top of the usual demographic controls, we need a measure of the speci￿c ability
of the individual. The PISA data set is one of the few that allows for the
constructions of these type of variables in a comparable way across countries.14
In terms of the dependent variable, PISA data include the secondary school
track for each student, usually aggregated in about ￿ve or six categories. As dis-
cussed in Section 2, we impose an additional aggregation to make Germany and
Italy more comparable. In the ￿nal speci￿cation we consider three tracks based
on the following de￿nition: the Academic track groups tracks that typically lead
to the acquisition of additional schooling at the tertiary level; the Technical track
includes tracks that leave the option to acquire additional schooling but under
some additional constraints; ￿nally the Vocational track includes tracks teach-
ing speci￿c skills designed to enter the labor market right after completion. The
mapping from the raw tracks available in PISA and our three-tracks speci￿ca-
tion is provided in Appendix 7 along with a more detailed discussion about the
criteria we used to group them.
To describe family background we would ideally like having information
about earnings, wealth and schooling of the family the student is living and has
lived with. PISA data provide very detailed information on some psychological
and social aspects of the family the student is living with but it does not provide
income variables.15 However our focus is on parent￿ s education, provided by a
su¢ ciently disaggregated grade completed variable, and we control for other
family background by using an Index of Socioeconomic Status, computed by
14For Italy, this is probably the only dataset on which something like this is possible.
Previous works, as for example Flabbi 2001, have used the typical source of household data
for Italy, the Bank of Italy Survey on Household Income and Wealth, but this data set does
not include information on the type of secondary school track completed, while only limited
information on family background (and no information on ability) is available. Therefore
authors were forced to use only young individuals living with their parents as estimation
sample.
15A word of caution is required about this type of information in PISA since the information
is provided by the 15-year-old themselves.
15PISA analysts based on parental occupations, and by constructing other poten-
tially relevant variables (such as the number of books in the house).16
Measures of individual ability are essential to reduce individual heterogene-
ity when estimating the impact of parents￿schooling on the secondary school
track chosen for their children. In PISA survey four di⁄erent types of cognitive
tests are performed, and special care is put to make them comparable across
countries and across tracks. The four types of tests are aimed to measure: (i)
mathematical ability; (ii) reading and writing skills; (iii) knowledge of science
and (iv) problem solving.17 Moreover, PISA data control for past school expe-
rience (failure in any previous grade) and for faster than usual completion of
grades.
The empirical speci￿cation we will assume is a standard Random Utility
Model (RUM) speci￿ed as a Multinomial Logit (MNL) model, the most pop-
ular speci￿cation when studying discrete choice models with more than two
alternatives. In our case we have three possible choices, denoted by k￿f1;2;3g,
that each individual, denoted by i￿f1;2;:::Ng, has to take based on the following
expected utility:
Uk;i = x0
i￿k + "k;i (1)
where x0
i￿k denotes the deterministic component and "k;i the random compo-
nent. The optimal strategy is to choose the alternative with the higher expected
utility, leading, for example, to the following probability to choose alternative
k = 1:
P (1jf1;2;3g) = P (U1;i > U2;i;U1;i > U3;i) (2)
Under the assumption that ("1;"2;"3) are independently and identically distrib-
uted following a standard Extreme value (or Gumbel) distribution, McFadden









that is the usual logistic form.
This brief review of the model is useful to emphasize three points. First,
identi￿cation requires one of the expected utilities to be normalized to zero. This
is an immediate consequence of the parametrization (1) and (3): the scale of the
utility cannot be identi￿ed. Second, it is more interesting to look at the inference
on the probabilities than on the expected utilities. Therefore we will focus on the
estimated marginal e⁄ects and not on the estimated utility parameters b ￿k. We
will call marginal e⁄ect also the discrete change in probability due to the impact
of a dummy variable. Finally, the model and the parametric assumption on the
errors lead to the property of Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA)
16We will use the complete set of these variables in one of the two speci￿cations we will
propose, labelled Richer Speci￿cation. The complete speci￿cation is in Appendix 7.
17Since each student receive only a fraction of the entire test for each area, the survey
assignes ￿ve plausible values for each type of ability. Following a common practice, we have
taken the average over the ￿ve.
16in the choice. From this property it is possible to obtain a speci￿cation test for
the model, developed by Hausman and McFadden 1984. The intuition is simple:
consider the ratio over the probabilities to choose two alternatives. If the IIA
property holds, then estimating the model including or excluding ￿irrelevant
alternatives￿ , i.e. in this case the third remaining alternative, should not have
much of an impact on the estimates for the two alternatives on which we were
computing the ratio. The statistic is build as in a standard Hausman test where
the unrestricted model includes the ￿irrelevant alternative￿and the restricted
model excludes it.18
The marginal e⁄ect we focus on is the change in probability due to a father or
a mother holding a tertiary level degree (typically College). After estimating by
maximum likelihood the MNL model previously described, we therefore compute
the change in probability for each individual by:
￿b Pi(kjf1;2;3g;xi) = b Pi(kjf1;2;3g;di = 1;xi) ￿ b Pi(kjf1;2;3g;di = 0;xi) (4)
where the statement (di = 1;xi) means that the dummy for having a mother
or/and a father with College is set to one and all the other regressors are set to
the original values for individual i. Since these marginal e⁄ects are unique for
each individual and they are not linear in the observables we incur in the usual
problem of how to give a sense of the average impact in the sample. We have
chosen to provide four descriptive measures in the Tables reporting the results
(Tables 2a and 2b): (i) the sample mean; (ii) the sample standard deviation
over ￿b Pi(kjf1;2;3g); (iii) the marginal e⁄ect at the average sample values of
the regressors and (iv) the proportion of individuals i for whom the marginal














The ￿rst measure is a good descriptive statistic of the average marginal
e⁄ect in the sample but it does not provide a clear way to assess the precision of
the estimates because a measure of variation of this estimate will include both
variation from the estimated values b ￿ and variation from the sample. The second
measure does not have an equally clear interpretation in terms of inference
because an individual with all the regressors set at the sample mean is often not
the ￿average individual￿one has in mind when looking for descriptive statistics.
On the other side, standard errors on (6) are informative and are obtained by
bootstrapping.
18McFadden 1987 shows how to perform the test using a Lagrange Multipliers test strategy.
17In addition to these four descriptive statistics for the marginal e⁄ects we also
provide the kernel density estimation of the distribution of the marginal e⁄ect
in the sample (Figure 3) and some ￿counterfactual￿marginal e⁄ects (Figure 4
and 5). These counterfactual marginal e⁄ects are obtained by setting all the
values of the regressors at the sample mean except for the regressor reported in
the x-axis (and of course the regressor on which we are computing the marginal
e⁄ect). Using the previous notation, the ￿counterfactual￿ marginal e⁄ect is
de￿ned as:
￿b Pi(kjf1;2;3g;xi) = (7)
b Pi(kjf1;2;3g;di = 1;xji;x￿j) ￿ b Pi(kjf1;2;3g;di = 0;xji;x￿j)
where x￿j denotes the sample mean for all the regressors except the regressor
j. In Figure 4 and 5, the value (7) is reported on the y-axis while the value for
xji is reported on the x-axis. These marginal e⁄ects should give a better sense
of how the marginal e⁄ects change in the sample as we change one regressor at
the time keeping everything else constant.
4.2 Results
Results about the marginal e⁄ects of parent￿ s schooling on the secondary school
track chosen by their children are reported in Tables 2a and 2b. The ￿rst Table
reports estimates on the male sample and the second on the female sample. We
have chosen to split the sample by gender because heterogeneity of behavior
between men and women seems particularly relevant in this context.19
The third row of Tables 2a and 2b reports the average marginal e⁄ect in the
sample, statistic (5), computed for each choice and the ￿fth row the marginal
e⁄ect at the sample mean of the regressors, statistic (6), computed for each
choice. Looking at Males in Italy, under the basic speci￿cation we estimate that
parents￿College more than double the average observed probability to choose
the Academic track. By this we mean that the average marginal e⁄ect (about
0.36 considering the mean and about 0.41 considering the impact at the mean
of the regressors) will increase the probability to choose the academic track by a
value higher than the observed probability (reported in the ￿rst row and equal
to about 0.279). As reported in the seventh row, parents￿College has a positive
e⁄ect on the probability to choose the academic track and a negative e⁄ect on
choosing the Vocational track for every individual in the sample. For about
14.4% of the sample, parents￿College has also a positive e⁄ect on choosing the
Technical track. The variation of these marginal impacts in the sample is quite
large, as described by the standard deviation reported in the fourth row, while
the estimates are reasonably precise as shown by the standard errors reported
in parenthesis on row six. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity due
to clusters at school levels.
19Motivation can be found in the discrimination literature (for example Altonjii and Blank
1999) or in previous works more similar to what we do such as Dustmann 2004.
18The previous results are obtained under a Basic Speci￿cation that simply
includes age (in months) as demographic control, the performance in the mathe-
matical cognitive test as ability control and dummies for two levels of education
completed by parents (￿High School￿ or ￿College or more￿ , ￿less than High
School￿being the excluded case) as family background controls. Dummies on
parents￿schooling are built by taking the maximum schooling level completed
by at least one parent; an additional dummy is included to take into account
which of the two parents (either father or mother) has the highest education.
This Basic Speci￿cation is mainly for comparison purposes while the Richer
Speci￿cation includes all the useful variables we can obtain from the PISA data
set without losing too many observations due to missing values. The complete
speci￿cation is reported in Appendix together with complete results from MNL
estimates (see tables A3.a and A.3.b). It adds a full array of controls for abil-
ity and family background leading to a smaller impact of parents￿schooling on
track choices. However, the impact is still substantial with an increase in the
probability to choose the Academic track of about 50% on average. Again the
estimates are reasonably precise, except for the marginal e⁄ect on choosing the
Vocational track.
Estimates on the male German sample shows a similar picture in terms of
the direction of the impact but the magnitude is always smaller than in Italy.
Parents￿College still has a substantial and signi￿cant impact in increasing the
probability to choose the academic track: the magnitude is about 50% on av-
erage under the basic speci￿cation and about 30% on average under the richer
speci￿cation. We ￿nd this a very useful comparison to judge the magnitude of
these impacts. Previous works have looked at Germany as a typical example
of a country with relatively low intergenerational mobility and at its secondary
school tracking system as an important factor in explaining this fact (Dustmann
2004, Schnepf 2002). We con￿rm this prediction but we also show that in an-
other European country with a milder tracking system this e⁄ect is even more
pronounced.
The average impact for women is relatively smaller in both countries: the
increase in the probability to choose the academic track due to at least one
parent with a Tertiary degree is about 70% and 35% on average in the two
speci￿cations for Italy and 62% and 32% on average in the two speci￿cations
for Germany. Di⁄erently from before there is almost no di⁄erence in the relative
impact between Italy and Germany. This is due to the fact that parents￿impact
is more important for male children than for female children in Italy while in
Germany the impact is almost equivalent on both subsamples. Therefore the
policy implications are sort of gender neutral in Germany while in Italy the
major problem seems the ine¢ cient allocation of male students due to a huge
impact of parents￿education even when controlling for quite detailed measures
of ability and for additional family background variables.
In terms of speci￿cation, the IIA test in general does not reject that this
property, implied by the MNL model, is valid and therefore does not reject the
speci￿cation we use. This is true for quite high P-values for all the speci￿cations
19estimated on both samples on both countries20. In terms of ￿t of the model,
we just report in the second row the predicted probability at the mean of the
sample: this very crude measure of ￿t shows a better ￿t on the Italian sample
than on the German sample. In particular, we systematically under-predict the
choice of the Academic track in Germany.
As already clear from the standard deviations reported in Table 2, there
is a lot of variation in the marginal e⁄ect across the sample. It is therefore
useful to have a sense of its distribution: Figure 3 reports the Kernel density
estimation of the marginal e⁄ects on choosing the Academic track in the richer
speci￿cation for each of the four sub-samples. As we can see the support is
similar for all of them (from about zero to about 0.28) but the distributions are
quite di⁄erent. If for German females it is quite similar to a uniform, for Italian
females we have a lot of probability mass around 0.2. Males are more similar
across countries with a mode right above zero and another one above 0.2. The
picture we get from these distributions is slightly more complex than the one we
obtain from simply looking at means. While when looking at means it seemed
that women were more homogenous across countries, looking at the distribution
this is not the case. A similar average e⁄ect is due in Italy to a lot of mass right
below the 0.2 value while in Germany to a roughly constant distribution over the
entire support. It becomes therefore interesting, in particular for Italy, to learn
more about the individuals that experiment such a positive marginal e⁄ect. We
investigate this by computing ￿counterfactual￿ marginal e⁄ects where we let
vary one regressor at the time keeping the others at the sample mean.
The ￿rst interesting variable on which we perform the experiment is the in-
dex of socioeconomic status: are individuals that experiment the highest impact
of parents￿education coming from families with higher or lower economic sta-
tus? In practice we are computing something similar to an interaction term but
performed on counterfactuals. Figure 4 shows that in Germany the marginal
e⁄ect is always increasing in the Parents Socioeconomic status: the higher the
socioeconomic status the more important is the impact of the parents in in-
creasing the probability to choose the academic track. This relation is roughly
similar for men and women. For Italy we have a di⁄erent picture: ￿rst, males
and females are very di⁄erent, second the relation is not monotone increasing.
In particular, for females it is almost constant, decreasing only at very high
levels of the socioeconomic status index, for males it is increasing and then de-
creasing. The decrease of the marginal e⁄ect for high level of socioeconomic
status may seem counterintuitive (however it is still strongly positive), but can
be rationalized when we consider that at very high levels the socioeconomic
status becomes relatively more important than the education status in taking
secondary school decisions.
The second group of variables we consider to build counterfactuals are scores
on individual ability tests. The computation of marginal e⁄ects of parents ed-
ucation by ability is directly related with the considerations we sketched in our
20The only exception are females in Germany under the basic speci￿cation when we test
excluding the Academic track. However, the test is not rejected when we used the richer
speci￿cation.
20very stylized model. Since results are similar across the four types of ability
indexes, we present in Figure 5 only results using the Combined Score in the
Mathematical test. Even more than in the previous case, we see how much more
di⁄erent are the two countries when we look at the entire distribution of the
marginal e⁄ects instead that at simple means of the marginal e⁄ects. For Ger-
many the marginal impact of parents education in choosing the academic track
is increasing in ability up to a score level well above the mean where it starts to
decrease. For Italy, instead it is roughly constant with a mild decrease for high
levels of ability. A potential interpretation of these results is as follows. In Ger-
many, at very low levels of ability the probability to choose the academic track
is very low and even the in￿ uence of parents education cannot overcome this
fact. As ability increases, parents education becomes more and more a crucial
factors. Finally for very high level of ability the probability to choose an acad-
emic track is so high that parents education loose importance. Of course, these
are statements relative to Italy and not relative to a ￿fully e¢ cient￿outcome
were ability should be the only predictor of track choices. In Italy, instead, the
almost constant impact reiterates how persistent, and independent from ability,
is the impact of parents education on track choices.
5 Impact of Family Background on Post-Secondary
Schooling
Above the Secondary Schooling level the degree of comparability between Ger-
many and Italy is radically reduced. First, in Italy any 5-years Secondary School
degree is su¢ cient to be admitted to College in any ￿eld of specialization. In
Germany, instead, this is true only for the academic track whereas the technical
track allows admission only to some post-secondary schools and the vocational
track to none. Second, there is no dataset that collects the same information
with the same criteria, as PISA does, on the two countries about Post-Secondary
schooling. However, it is extremely interesting to have at least a glimpse at what
happens right after secondary school. Are tracks a strong predictor of the total
level of schooling completed? Have family backgrounds still a strong in￿ uence
or is their in￿ uence limited to the secondary level?
To attempt to at least partially answer these questions we use two ap-
proaches. First, we further exploit the PISA survey by looking at student as-
pirations. In the questionnaire, surveyed students were asked about the level
of educational attainment they expected to complete. Clearly, this is not the
same as the actual choice but at least we can maintain some comparability
across countries by using the same data source. Moreover, the determinants
of aspirations are of some interest in themselves. Second, we use two di⁄erent
country-speci￿c data sets to look at actual Post-secondary school choices. For
Italy we use a Survey conducted by the Italian National Institute of Statistics
(ISTAT) on a representative sample of individuals three years after graduation
from Secondary School while for Germany we use a sample extracted from the
21German Socioeconomic Panel Study (SOEP). As we will explain in more details
later, the extraction from the SOEP sample is obtained in way as to match the
demographic characteristics of the Italian sample as much as possible.
5.1 Determinants of Aspirations about Post-secondary School-
ing
The fraction of students expecting to enrol University is clearly di⁄erent across
tracks, but the di⁄erences in aspirations are also signi￿cant across countries: the
87.9% of students in the Italian academic track aspire to complete tertiary ed-
ucation (ISCED 5A-5B-6), while the same percentage declines to 51.3% among
young Germans in the Gymnasium. The fraction of students aspiring to uni-
versity enrolment is lower in technical schools (39.2% in Italy and 24.0% in
Germany) and quite small in vocational schools (24.7% in Italy and 15.7% in
Germany).21 The observation that the fraction of students planning to enrol
university is larger in Italy than in Germany is consistent with what we have pre-
viously remarked about the screening abilities of these two educational systems.
This is particularly true when we compare intention with actual behaviors: in
2002 (most recent data available) the 23.6% of the age cohort at the typical age
of graduation attained a tertiary degree in Italy, while 29% of Germans in the
same cohort achieved a degree.22
In table 3 we report the estimates for the coe¢ cients of interest in a probit
model predicting the aspiration to enrol university (full model estimates are
reported in tables A.4.a and A.4.b in the appendix).
Two results are surprising: parental education is mostly signi￿cant only in
Italy, even when fully accounting for ability (extended version), while it is al-
most insigni￿cant in the German case. In addition, the probability impact of
a graduate parent is higher in Italy, and more pronounced for males than for
females. Measured ability does not seem to play any role, as if aspirations of stu-
dents were independent of their school performance, conditioning on secondary
school tracks. As expected, the type of secondary school attended a⁄ect the
intention to enrol in University: if we compute the odd ratio of a student choos-
ing the academic track compared with the technical track, it ranges between 6.0
21It is worth noticing that almost half (45.3%) of the German students do not answer to
this question, and the fraction is highest among students attending vocational schools (76.4%).
This is somewhat reasonable since they may intepret as the question not applying to them. Of
course, it is still possible for a student in the vocational track to "aspire" to a College education
because they can always integrate their vocational degree with additional education to get
the appropriate degree to be admitted to College. If students in vocational schools tend to
not express their aspirations, the fraction of students aspiring to university is likely to be
overestimated in the German sample.
22Data from OECD 2004, Education at a glance, table A3.1. There are di⁄erences between
countries at tertiary level that may be partially responsible for this di⁄erence: while Germany
has a well developed technical tertiary education (ISCED 5B), Italy almost completely lacks
this type of schools. The 29% of German students achieving a university degree is made of
9.8% from technical universities, 6.5% of students achieving a 3-4 year degree and 12.7% of
students attaining a 5-6 year degree. The corresponding ￿gure for Italy are 0.9%, 2.5% and
20.2%.
22and 2.8 in Italy and 2.0 and 0 in Germany. The analysis of students aspirations
con￿rms what we have already found in the case of the secondary school choice:
parental in￿uence is higher in Italy than in Germany, even after controlling
for the type of secondary school attended, which in turn plays a role in shaping
expectations on the future. When looking at the full version of the estimated
model, we notice that various abilities are more signi￿cant in Germany than
in Italy, but this result su⁄er from multicollinearity among these variables; in
addition, estimated signs are sometimes negative, thus contradicting theoretical
expectations.
5.2 Determinants of Post-secondary Schooling Choices
By looking at the determinants of Post-Secondary school choices we want to see
whether family in￿ uence on post-secondary schooling decision persist beyond
the previous choice of a secondary school track. If this is not the case, we can
claim that (one of) the main channel by which the family background a⁄ects
long term schooling decision is the track choice at the secondary school level.
Such a conclusion would constitute only a partial answer to our question if
the secondary school system increases or decreases intergenerational mobility in
schooling but it will be a clear indication of the direction that policy reforms
should take to have a substantial impact. Otherwise, if we still ￿nd a persistent
e⁄ect of parental education on post-secondary choices, even after controlling
for secondary school attended, then we may question whether intergenerational
mobility in incomes has most to do with educational choices, or rather with
other factors (like social networking in the labor market, for example).
This strategy is a much more direct test than looking at aspirations but it
comes at the cost of losing a data set that is very homogenous across countries,
that is we do not have a data set with a structure similar to PISA to study
post-secondary school decision. We are then looking at country-speci￿c data
sets that can have the information we need.
For Italy we use a Survey conducted by the Italian National Institute of
Statistics (ISTAT) on a representative sample of individuals three years after
graduation from Secondary School. Individuals were interviewed in 2001. After
losing about 5% of the sample due to missing values, the ￿nal estimation sample
is quite large, with 20929 valid observations. Some descriptive statistics on
this sample are reported in Appendix (see Table A.5). For Germany we use
the German Socioeconomic Panel Study (SOEP) for the year 2001 and 2002.
We try to create a sample that can match the characteristics of the Italian
sample as much as possible. We end up selecting individuals that have obtained
their secondary school degree from at least 2 years and from no more than 10
years and that are between 18 and 30 years old. We do not match exactly the
demographic characteristics of the Italian sample for a problem of numerosity.
Even with these much larger intervals on age and years from graduation we can
extract only 374 individuals with no missing values on the relevant variables for
males and 430 for females. The crucial variable reducing the numerosity are
the grades obtained in school, that we use to proxy ability, which are present
23in SOEP only starting in 2001. Some descriptive statistics on this sample are
reported in Appendix.
Given the di⁄erent structure of the data we will compare two di⁄erent spec-
i￿cations for Italy and Germany. In particular, on the Italian sample we will be
able to address also the dropped out behavior and we will also propose sequen-
tial logit estimates to better approximate the choice structure. On the German
sample, instead, we will simply look at College enrollment and we will perform
only standard logit. On a positive side we are using a probably better measure
of parent￿ s educational background because we know the secondary school track
of the parents.
On the Italian sample we will work with a discrete choice model equal to
the one described in the previous section with the di⁄erence that now the al-
ternative choices are: (i) Never enrol in College (ii) Drop-out from College, and
(iii) Complete College (as proxied by the fact of being still enrolled full-time
after three years). Given the extremely high drop-out rate among College stu-
dents in Italy, it seems particularly interesting to allow the model to capture
this behavior. The data are appropriate because they identify individuals that
enrolled in College after completing High School and dropped out sometime in
the following three years. People still enrolled full-time after three years seems
a reasonable proxy for individuals that will actually complete College. These
three alternatives, though, have a particular structure because the choices are
very likely to be taken sequentially: ￿rst individuals decide if enrolling in Col-
lege or not and later, conditional on this choice and the ensuing performance, if
staying in College or Drop-out. We will therefore focus on estimating a Sequen-
tial Logit model and we will report estimates from a Multinomial Logit model
as a comparison. The sequential logit generates the following parametrization
of the probability to choose each alternative:





















from which it is possible to identify (￿;￿) by observing the choices and the
regressors. Estimation will be performed by maximum likelihood.
Table 4 reports marginal e⁄ects of at least a parent with College on the
Italian sample by gender. As in the previous section we use a basic speci￿cation
and a richer speci￿cation. The main di⁄erence between the two speci￿cations
is about the proxies for ability: in the basic speci￿cation we simply control for
the grade obtained at the end of lower secondary school (Scuola Media) while
in the richer speci￿cation we build a 16 outcomes variable combining for each
individual grades at the end of lower secondary school and grades at the end of
secondary school.23
23The di⁄erent way of building the ability controls generates a di⁄erent numerosity for the
24Again as in the previous section we reports the average marginal e⁄ects, the
marginal e⁄ects at the mean of the regressors and the proportion of individuals
with a positive impact. For example the third row report the average marginal
e⁄ect of at least one parent with College computed as in (5) while the ￿fth row
computed as in (6). The main objective of the exercise is to see how the impact
of parent￿ s education changes when we control for secondary school tracks: in
the Table this means to compare the ￿rst three columns with the last three
columns.
Looking at Tables 4a and 4b, the sign of the impact is as expected on the
Enrolled alternative - a positive impact of parents￿College - and on the Never
Enrolled alternative - a negative impact - while results are mixed on the Drop-
out alternative. The magnitude of the impact is huge without controlling for
track on the male sample: having at least a parent with College increase the
probability to be continuously enrolled in College by more than 100% even in
the richer speci￿cation. On the female sample the impact is relatively lower but
still quite high.
When secondary school tracks completed are controlled for the impact is
signi￿cantly reduced: for both man and women the magnitude of the impact is
about 45% lower. This suggests that the secondary school track is an e⁄ective
channel of the impact of family background on the ￿nal level of schooling com-
pleted. However, even in the richer speci￿cation and with controls for tracks we
observe a persistent direct e⁄ect of parents￿education on College choices.24
The estimates are generally precise except for the Drop-out choice. We
tentatively interpret this as a composition e⁄ect due to the higher heterogeneity
of individuals choosing this alternative. In terms of the comparison between
the Conditional Logit model and the Multinomial Logit model we observe some
di⁄erences in the point estimates but similar qualitative results. As expected,
the IIA test systematically rejects the independence assumption imposed by
the Multinomial Logit model when the alternatives Drop-out and Enrolled are
eliminated.
Results can be summarized as follows for Italy: (i) secondary school track
controls imply a large and signi￿cant reduction of the impact of parents￿edu-
cation on College choices; (ii) the impact of family background is signi￿cantly
smaller for women in all the speci￿cations; (iii) a signi￿cant impact of parents￿
education on staying in College remains even after controlling for secondary
tracks. The inference we draw from these results is consistent with what we
have found in the previous section: (i) the secondary school track choice is
one of the major channel of the intergenerational persistence in schooling levels
but not the only one; (ii) women behavior is more independent from family
richer and basic speci￿cation because the ￿ grade obtained at the end of Scuola Media￿has
more missing values than the variables on the grades at the end of secondary school. In the
richer speci￿cation we have chosen to input some of the missing scuola media grades based on
the other individual characteristics and therefore generating a sample with more observations
than the sample in the basic speci￿cation.
24A signi￿cant direct e⁄ect of parents￿education on College choices is also the main result
of Flabbi 2001 using a di⁄erent, and less rapresentative, data set for Italy.
25backgrounds than men behavior.
As mentioned, in Germany the mapping from secondary school tracks and
post-secondary school choices is very di⁄erent than in Italy. We aggregate the
post-secondary choices in three possible alternatives: (i) if enrolled in University
or completed a University degree (includes University degrees (Universitaet) and
Technical college degree (Fachhochschule)); (ii) if enrolled or completed a Post-
secondary vocational degree or Apprenticeship (includes apprenticeship (Lehre),
Vocational schools (Berufsfachschule), Technical school (Fachschule) and other
training and vocational schools); (iii) if never enrolled in any Post-secondary
degree and never obtained additional schooling on top of secondary schooling.
Not all secondary school tracks are enough to be admitted to all the alternatives.
Therefore we only select individuals that have completed a secondary school
track that admits at least one choice in the three aggregate alternatives we
have constructed. Namely, this implies eliminating individuals that have only
completed the Hauptschulabschluss. Moreover we are forced to use only SOEP
data from 2001 and 2002 to have grade information and to impose age limit
to match the Italian data, as mentioned before. Due to these data limitations
and the resulting low numerosity we have chosen a particularly parsimonious
speci￿cation: the only demographic controls are age and martial status; the only
family background controls are the "highest" secondary school track completed
by the parents; and the only ability controls are the grades in mathematics at
the of secondary school. We have also available grades in German but results
are not sensitive to including grades in German or mathematics.25 The family
background information we are choosing - secondary school track of the parents
where we rank higher the academic track, followed by the technical track and
by the vocational track - is highly correlated with the usual family background
information used - highest level of schooling completed - but it is probably more
appropriate to study the impact of secondary school tracks on intergenerational
mobility in schooling.
The marginal e⁄ect we focus our attention on is the impact of having at least
one parent with an Academic secondary school degree (Abitur) on the three
alternatives described above. As on the Italian sample, we want to assess how
this impact changes when we control for the secondary school track completed
by the individual. Table 5 reports the results with the usual statistic: mean and
standard deviation of the marginal e⁄ects in the sample, marginal e⁄ect at the
mean and IIA tests. The complete set of results on the estimated coe¢ cients
from which we have computed the marginal e⁄ects is in Appendix.
In all the speci￿cations, we obtain the expected sign: at least a parent with
an academic degree increases the probability to choose a University degree and
decreases the probability to choose a Vocational degree. The impact on the
choice to never enroll in any Post-secondary degree is more mixed: it is on
average positive but in many speci￿cations it is very small or not signi￿cant.
Moreover, this group of individuals has a very low numerosity so we consider
25A more complete set of ability controls that includes or combines all grades available
generates too many dummies to guarantee a credible esimation.
26the estimated impacts on this alternative not very robust. Focusing on the im-
pact of choosing a post-secondary vocational school or a University degree, we
see some patterns similar to Italy: the impact is signi￿cant but it is reduced
when secondary school tracks controls are included in the speci￿cation. This
reduction, however, is relatively lower than on the Italian sample. Moreover,
the result is more robust on the female sample than on the male sample. On the
male sample, the positive impact on choosing the academic degree as measured
by the sample mean of the marginal e⁄ect is almost unchanged when we intro-
duce track controls. We read this generally lower changes when we introduce
track controls as consistent with the Italy/Germany comparison of the previous
section: secondary school track choices are less a⁄ected by family background
in Germany than in Italy and therefore the residual impact of family back-
ground on post-secondary school choices is less sensitive to secondary school
track controls.
6 Conclusions
The aim of the present paper is to study the interaction between family back-
ground and educational choice in tracked educational systems. The availability
of a sorting device represented by di⁄erent types of secondary schools (acad-
emic, technical or vocational) does not necessarily represent a reinforcement of
social immobility, this depending on how students are allocated to tracks. At
one extreme, one may think at a perfectly meritocratic system, where track
allocation is based on pure ability. In this set-up, intergenerational mobility is
at the highest, with the only limitation given by the correlation between child
ability and parental education (which is typically referred in the literature as
￿genetic￿transmission of ability). At the other extreme, one may think of a
perfectly ascriptive system, where track allocation mainly depends on parental
background: in this case mobility is lower, because children educational choices
replicate parental ones (this has obviously to be interpreted in probabilistic
terms: a graduate student is very likely to have studied in an academic track,
which is very likely to have been chosen by graduate parents).
We have studied two countries, Italy and Germany, where the educational
systems are characterized by a secondary school divided in separate tracks.
We have shown that parental education (having at least one parent with college
degree) increases the probability of selecting (or being selected into) an academic
track, and this e⁄ect is stronger in Italy than in Germany, especially for boys
(41% vs 14% for males, 35% vs 33% for females). However when we look at the
distribution of marginal e⁄ects, the two countries are very di⁄erent also on the
female sample: parental education and individual ability seem complements in
increasing the probability of selecting an academic track in Germany, but they
are rather independent one from the other in Italy.
Our interpretation of these results is that sorting of students across sec-
ondary school tracks is closer to a sorting by ability in Germany and closer
to a sorting by family background in Italy. By using a rich set of alternative
27proxies for students￿abilities (based on their level of competencies and their
previous educational career) and parental background (not just education, but
￿nancial resources - correlated with occupation - and cultural resources - cor-
related with books availability), we show that the latter group of variables is
more relevant in the case of Germany than in the case of Italy, while the re-
verse situation applies with respect to parental background. Thus the same
institutional framework may produce alternative outcomes, irrespective of the
degree of institutional rigidities (which we have shown being higher in Germany
than in Italy). The situation is maintained and aggravated when we extend
our analysis to post-secondary choices. One of the main virtue of tracked ed-
ucational system advocated by its supporters is the diversion of less talented
students away from the educational ladder. If the track selection is working as
a sorting device, the role of the family should vanish as long as a child has been
sorted in the ￿right￿track. But if the track selection can be overrun by family
in￿ uence (students in academic track from poor background are led to dropout,
while student in vocational tracks from good background are pushed towards
post-secondary education), then even this supposed virtue of the tracking sys-
tem tends to disappear. Our empirical analysis shows that parental in￿ uence on
post-secondary choices is greatly reduced when we control for secondary school
track on the Italian sample. On the German sample we ￿nd a similar result
but with a much smaller magnitude. Also on post-secondary choices we con-
￿rm gender asymmetries, with women behavior more independent from family
background in Italy and more dependent on it in Germany.
Compared to previous literature (Dustmann 2004, Schnepf 2002) our results
point in a di⁄erent direction. Previous works have looked at Germany as a
typical example of a country with relatively low intergenerational mobility and
at its secondary school tracking system as an important factor in explaining
this fact. We show that this is not necessarily related to the tracking of the
secondary school system itself,26 but to the way in which students are sorted.
By providing evidence of another European country, Italy, with a more ￿ exible
tracking system (later selection, possibility to refuse teachers￿advice), we show
that parental background may be even more pronounced, thus yielding lower
intergenerational mobility in educational attainments.
Our main policy implication is that tracking can be e¢ ciently designed in
order to reduce mismatch and increase intergenerational mobility: it requires
sorting rules based on ability and not on parental background. This is not an
easy task anyhow, since it requires to collect information on students (cognitive
and non-cognitive) abilities, which are not necessarily available at early age.
If the information when the relevant decision is taken is not enough the risk
of mismatch is too high and the elimination (or the postponement) of tracks
at secondary level could be considered as an appropriate second best. An al-
ternative or complementary policy to achieve a progressive tracking by ability
could be increasing mobility across tracks based on grades or standardized tests.
26Which may also have positive implications: for example Brunello and Hariga 2007 show
that tracked educational systems raise the competences of adults once in the labor force.
28The worse of possible worlds is retaining separate tracks while eliminating any
￿institutional￿tracking-by-ability feature. The result of such a system would
be the reinforcement of parental in￿ uence on educational choices, leading to
lower intergenerational mobility and to ine¢ cient lock-in e⁄ects. Italy seems
closer to such a system than Germany, a country for which some authors have




The Pisa (Programme for International Student Assessment) is a survey coordi-
nated by the OECD and conducted by Canada Statistics (www.pisa.org). The
￿rst wave has been run in 2000 in 35 countries, while a second wave was run in
2003 in 48 countries. The aim of the programme is the assessment of student
skills (literacy, mathematical, scienti￿c knowledge and problem solving) in a
comparable way across countries.
The estimation sample is extracted from the raw data using the usual crite-
ria, that is we keep observations that have no missing values over all the variables
we use in the speci￿cation. This procedure generates small di⁄erences between
the estimation sample in the basic speci￿cation and the estimation sample in
the richer speci￿cation. We have tried to estimate the basic speci￿cation on
the richer speci￿cation sample and results were not signi￿cantly di⁄erent. In
general the amount of observations we loose due to missing values is not too
large and, by simply comparing descriptive statistics, does not seem to select the
sample in any particular way. For sake of concision, we have chosen to present
descriptive statistics only for the richer speci￿cation sample. They are reported
in Table A.2.
Dependent variable: secondary school tracks.
We have chosen to aggregate the original tracks provided in PISA in the
three tracks Academic, Technical and Vocational to increase the comparability
across countries. For Germany we start with the three tracks division that is
still at the core of the German secondary school system27: Haputschule (Voca-
tional), Realschule (Technical) and Gymnasium (Academic). We then allocate
to Vocational the Berufschule and those remaining tracks that do not give ac-
cess to upper secondary (Koop. Gesamtschule). We allocate to Technical those
remaining tracks that give potential access to upper secondary but that are not
Gymnasium (Comprehensive with access to upper secondary). Finally, we al-
locate to Academic those remaining tracks de￿ned as upper secondary even if
they are not called Gymnasium (Comprehensive in upper secondary).
For Italy, we de￿ned the Academic track to include the tracks: Liceo Clas-
sico, Scienti￿co and Linguistico. We de￿ned the Technical track to include the
Istituti Tecnici and ￿nally we de￿ne the Vocational track to include the Scuole
Professionali and the Scuole d￿ Arte.
Regressors: ability indicators.
In addition to gender and age (measured in months), we consider whether
foreign born (foreign) and/or whether speaking at home a di⁄erent language (di-
alect). With respect to family background, we consider the highest educational
attainment in the couple of parents (histedaggr1 = ISCED 0-1-2; histedaggr2 =
ISCED 3-4; histedaggr3 = ISCED 5-6) and whether the mother is the highest ed-
ucational attainment in the couple (mhist). In addition we also include parental
occupation (through the highest occupational prestige in the parental couple -
27In italics we report the original tracks provided in the PISA raw data.
30hisei), as proxy of family income, whether the mother was working (housewife)
and the number of boos available at home (books1 = up to 25 books; books2 =
from 25 to 200 books; books3 = more than 200). We also include information
whether both parents are living in the family (intact)
With respect to ability, we consider the test scores (averaged over the 5
plausible values) in the four areas (combmath = numeracy; combread = literacy;
combscie = scienti￿c knowledge; combprob = problem solving). We also look
at previous educational career including information whether one is in line with
the age pro￿le of his/her cohort (regular1 = students lagging behind at least
one year; regular3 = students one or more year ahead) and/or whether s/he has
experienced being retarded at least once in previous year).
While parental background variables do not exhibit signi￿cant di⁄erences
between genders, when going to ability boys are more likely to have experienced
failures. They have higher test scores in math and science, and lower ones in
literacy.
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34Table 1 - Overlapping of ability distributions
Italy males Italy females Germany males Germany females
Mathematical ability
Vocational - Technical 0.59 0.75 0.62 0.66
Vocational - Academic 0.39 0.62 0.21 0.26
Technical - Academic 0.74 0.84 0.47 0.50
Reading ability
Vocational - Technical 0.62 0.75 0.59 0.64
Vocational - Academic 0.37 0.58 0.22 0.26
Technical - Academic 0.69 0.79 0.49 0.49
Note: the ￿gures reported in the table correspond to the overlapping coe¢ cient
broposed by Bradley (1985): given two random variables, x1 and x2;and denoting with
f (xi) their density functions (that we estimate through a kernel estimator - see ￿gures
1 and 2), the overlapping coe¢ cient is given by OV L =
P
￿ min[f (x1):f (x2)]:
The OV L coe¢ cient ranges between 0 and 1: a value of 0 implies absence of overlap
(disjoint distributions), whereas a value of 1 indicates identical distributions.
35Table 2a: Marginal E⁄ect of at least one Parent with College
on Secondary School Track Choice. MNL Model - Males
Italy Germany
Vocational Technical Academic Vocational Technical Academic
Basic Speci￿cation:
Observed Distribution 0.273 0.448 0.279 0.357 0.349 0.293
Predicted Distribution 0.241 0.526 0.233 0.374 0.497 0.129
Marginal e⁄ects:
Mean -0.1307 -0.2252 0.3559 0.0016 -0.1475 0.1459
Standard Deviation 0.0576 0.1607 0.1214 0.0362 0.0800 0.1141
At x -0.1880 -0.2258 0.4138 -0.0061 -0.1427 0.1488
(0.0325) (0.0428) (0.0416) (0.0517) (0.0509) (0.0411)
Proportion Positive 0.0000 0.1440 1.0000 0.4683 0.0000 1.0000




Observed Distribution 0.263 0.453 0.284 0.326 0.361 0.314
Predicted Distribution 0.226 0.580 0.195 0.300 0.578 0.122
Marginal e⁄ects:
Mean -0.0561 -0.0882 0.1443 0.0896 -0.1907 0.1011
Standard Deviation 0.0289 0.0904 0.0789 0.0735 0.0602 0.0912
At x -0.0863 -0.0843 0.1706 0.1375 -0.2262 0.0887
(0.0284) (0.0394) (0.0394) (0.0575) (0.0535) (0.0454)
Proportion Positive 0.000 0.256 1.000 0.8689 0.0000 1.0000
IIA Test: P-value 0.5971 0.6386 0.8728 0.5744 0.7252 0.2793
Log-likelihood -4152.9694 -1268.07
N 5322 1831
Note: Data from PISA 2003. Standard errors in parentheses robust to clusters at
school level. It is reported the impact of father or/and mother completing a tertiary
level degree. Estimates are from Multinomial logit weighted by strati￿cation weight
reported by PISA. Complete results in Appendix.
36Table 2b: Marginal E⁄ect of at least one Parent with College
on Secondary School Track Choice. MNL Model - Females
Italy Germany
Vocational Technical Academic Vocational Technical Academic
Basic Speci￿cation:
Observed Distribution 0.238 0.273 0.489 0.260 0.366 0.374
Predicted Distribution 0.184 0.308 0.508 0.238 0.512 0.250
Marginal e⁄ects:
Mean -0.1409 -0.2014 0.3422 -0.1147 -0.1157 0.2304
Standard Deviation 0.0505 0.0464 0.0286 0.0459 0.1339 0.1285
At x -0.1517 -0.2070 0.3587 -0.1643 -0.1697 0.3340
(0.0256) (0.0324) (0.0369) (0.0352) (0.0552) (0.0631)
Proportion Positive 0.0000 0.0003 1.0000 0.0000 0.2921 1.0000




Observed Distribution 0.236 0.272 0.492 0.229 0.377 0.394
Predicted Distribution 0.178 0.306 0.516 0.190 0.562 0.249
Marginal e⁄ects:
Mean -0.1167 -0.0549 0.1715 -0.0106 -0.1147 0.1253
Standard Deviation 0.0519 0.0443 0.0363 0.0188 0.0686 0.0846
At x -0.1243 -0.0756 0.1999 -0.0340 -0.1568 0.1908
(0.0235) (0.0316) (0.0352) (0.0348) (0.0581) (0.0675)
Proportion Positive 0.0000 0.1313 1.0000 0.2629 0.0000 1.0000
IIA Test: P-value 0.8617 0.7606 0.8203 0.5697 0.3101 0.2529
Log-likelihood -5189.93 -1430.98
N 5895 1974
Note: See previous table.
37Table 3: Aspirations: marginal e⁄ect on intention
to procceed further in education
Italy Germany
Speci￿cation: Basic Richer Basic Richer
Males
highest education in couple upper secondary 0.131 0.073 -0.033 -0.08
(0.035) (0.034) (0.061) (0.074)
highest education in couple tertiary 0.222 0.116 0.161 0.056
(0.032) (0.035) (0.057) (0.074)
mother is highest in education -0.062 -0.045 -0.034 0.004
(0.026) (0.028) (0.034) (0.039)
ability (mathematics) 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
attending technical school 0.239 0.22 0.141 0.083
(0.038) (0.040) (0.058) (0.071)
attending high school 0.667 0.628 0.295 0.23
(0.024) (0.029) (0.057) (0.073)
N 5341 5168 1094 1012
Pseudo R-squared 0.33 0.35 0.11 0.16
Log likelihood -2488.11 -2314.41 -654.07 -575.97
Females
Basic Richer Basic Richer
highest education in couple upper secondary 0.079 0.02 -0.021 0.042
(0.020) (0.023) (0.069) (0.075)
highest education in couple tertiary 0.158 0.052 0.142 0.139
(0.021) (0.027) (0.072) (0.076)
mother is highest in education -0.026 -0.002 0.078 0.083
(0.02) (0.019) (0.041) (0.041)
ability (mathematics) 0.001 0 0.001 -0.001
(0.000) 0 (0.000) 0
attending technical school 0.077 0.077 -0.041 -0.086
(0.035) (0.033) (0.073) (0.08)
attending high school 0.465 0.435 0.174 0.123
(0.035) (0.035) (0.068) (0.077)
N 5866 5759 1356 1279
Pseudo R-squared 0.26 0.29 0.12 0.17
Log likelihood -2736.95 -2565.82 -784.59 -699.73
Notes: PISA 2003. Robust standard errors in brackets, clusters on schools. *
signi￿cant at 5%; ** signi￿cant at 1%. Weighed using student sample size. Dependent
variable=1 if the student declear s/he intend to proceed further to tertiary education.
The basic estimates control for age. The richer version controls for foreign, family
situation, occupational prestige, availability of books and previous educational career.
38Table 4a: Marginal E⁄ect of at least one Parent with College
on Post-Secondary School Choice - Male Sample, Italy













Observed Distribution 0.6503 0.0580 0.2918 0.6503 0.0580 0.2918
Predicted Distribution 0.6692 0.0655 0.2653 0.6595 0.0713 0.2692
Marginal E⁄ects:
Mean -0.4584 0.0119 0.4465 -0.3035 0.0202 0.2833
Standard Deviation 0.0891 0.0261 0.0737 0.0900 0.0245 0.0789
At x -0.5187 0.0097 0.5090 -0.3841 0.0200 0.3641
(0.0135) (0.0116) (0.0190) (0.0266) (0.0125) (0.0281)




Observed Distribution 0.6501 0.0579 0.2921 0.6501 0.0579 0.2921
Predicted Distribution 0.6770 0.0661 0.2570 0.6693 0.0728 0.2579
Marginal E⁄ects:
Mean -0.4491 0.0069 0.4421 -0.3082 0.0137 0.2945
Standard Deviation 0.0194 0.0124 0.0212 0.0238 0.0116 0.0274
At x -0.3700 0.0075 0.3625 -0.2202 0.0121 0.2082
(0.0857) (0.0255) (0.0806) (0.0809) (0.0217) (0.0769)





Test IIA: P-value 0.4175 0.4164 0.3614 0.1008 0.4633 0.0809
Marginal E⁄ects:
At x -0.5226 0.0103 0.5123 -0.3860 0.0214 0.3646
(0.0156) (0.0104) (0.0178) (0.0228) (0.0131) (0.0239)
Richer Speci￿cation:
Test IIA: P-value 0.8554 0.5009 0.529 0.7656 0.0443 0.3669
Marginal E⁄ects:
At x -0.4527 0.0069 0.4458 -0.3092 0.0156 0.2937
(0.0204) (0.0111) (0.0221) (0.0273) (0.0136) (0.0276)
Notes: Dependent variable =1 Never Enrolled; =2 Dropped-out; =3 Still Enrolled
after three years. Richer speci￿cation includes controls for: family background, demo-
graphic characteristics, ability (grades). Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses.
39Table 4b: Marginal E⁄ect of at least one Parent with College
on Post-Secondary School Choice - Female Sample, Italy













Observed Distribution 0.5567 0.0525 0.3908 0.5567 0.0525 0.3908
Predicted Distribution 0.5545 0.0591 0.3863 0.5370 0.0632 0.3997
Marginal E⁄ects:
Mean -0.4520 0.0007 0.4514 -0.3281 0.0176 0.3105
Standard Deviation 0.1147 0.0206 0.0983 0.1138 0.0212 0.0976
At x -0.4921 -0.0044 0.4964 -0.3868 0.0112 0.3755
(0.0108) (0.0071) (0.0120) (0.0205) (0.0107) (0.0217)




Observed Distribution 0.5568 0.0530 0.3903 0.5568 0.0530 0.3903
Predicted Distribution 0.5587 0.0597 0.3816 0.5393 0.0643 0.3963
Marginal E⁄ects:
Mean -0.3703 -0.0051 0.3754 -0.2536 0.0069 0.2467
Standard Deviation 0.0968 0.0203 0.0859 0.0936 0.0183 0.0841
At x -0.4293 -0.0089 0.4382 -0.3255 0.0022 0.3233
(0.0176) (0.0085) (0.0180) (0.0254) (0.0118) (0.0264)





Test IIA: P-value 0.5964 0.0067 0.5206 0.0709 0.0639 0.0017
Marginal E⁄ects:
At x -0.4955 -0.0048 0.5004 -0.3901 0.0105 0.3796
(0.0117) (0.0084) (0.0139) (0.0182) (0.0115) (0.0203)
Richer Speci￿cation:
Test IIA: P-value 0.2799 0.1404 0.3969 0.2998 0.2423 0.2021
Marginal E⁄ects:
At x -0.4333 -0.0075 0.4408 -0.3295 0.0036 0.3259
(0.0158) (0.0087) (0.0174) (0.0217) (0.0112) (0.0232)
Notes: see Table 4a.
40Table 5a: Marginal E⁄ect of at least one Parent with Academic
Secondary School degree (Abitur) on Post-Secondary School Choice
MNL Model - Male Sample, Germany













Observed Distr. 0.0749 0.5802 0.3449 0.0749 0.5802 0.3449
Predicted Distr. 0.0527 0.6148 0.3325 0.0851 0.7607 0.1744
Marginal E⁄ects:
Mean 0.1030 -0.3918 0.2887 0.0631 -0.3108 0.248
Standard Dev. 0.0760 0.0534 0.0634 0.0756 0.1885 0.2351
At x 0.0724 -0.4304 0.3580 0.1029 -0.2199 0.1171
(0.0421) (0.0684) (0.0756) (0.0650) (0.0899) (0.0765)
Proportion Pos. 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.847 0.000 0.992
IIA Test: P-value 0.4956 0.8271 0.4778 0.4696 0.4591 0.8044
Log-likelihood -266.45 -202.430
N 373 373
Notes: Data from GSOEP 2001 and 2002. Dependent variable is: =1 if en-
rolled in University or completed a University degree; =2 if enrolled or completed
a Post-secondary vocational degree or Apprenticeship; =3 if never enrolled in any
Post-secondary degree. Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. Complete results
in Appendix.
41Table 5b: Marginal E⁄ect of at least one Parent with Academic
Secondary School degree (Abitur) on Post-Secondary School Choice
MNL Model - Female Sample, Germany













Observed Distr. 0.0471 0.5882 0.3647 0.0471 0.5882 0.3647
Predicted Distr. 0.0405 0.6155 0.3439 0.0122 0.7297 0.2581
Marginal E⁄ects:
Mean 0.0183 -0.4227 0.4043 0.0444 -0.2823 0.2380
Standard Dev. 0.0241 0.0423 0.0571 0.0505 0.1248 0.1595
At x 0.0064 -0.4709 0.4645 0.0139 -0.3258 0.3119
(0.0216) (0.0583) (0.0096) (0.0124) (0.0765) (0.0769)
Proportion Pos. 0.831 0.000 1.000 0.903 0.000 1.000
IIA Test: P-value 0.8924 0.9731 0.7442 0.0000 0.5535 0.5962
Log-likelihood -292.90 -235.92
N 425 425
Notes: See Table 5a.
428 Appendix





speaking dialect at home dialect
combined score in mathematical test combmath
combined score in reading test combread
combined score in science test combscie
combined score in problem solvingtest combprob
slower than usual in completing grades regular1
regular in completing grades regular2
faster than usual in completing grades regular 3
failed at least once failed
highest parents completed primary histedaggr1
highest parents completed secondary histedaggr2
highest parents completed tertiary histedaggr3
mother is highest mhist
parents living together intact
highest parents socio-economic status hisei
mother currently housewife housewife
less than 25 books at home books1
between 25 and 200 books at home books2




43Tab A.2a: Descriptive Statistics PISA sample - Italy
full sample male female
variable name wgh.mean sd wgh.mean sd wgh.mean sd
female 0.529 0.499
age 15.707 0.285 15.699 0.283 15.714 0.287
foreign 0.025 0.157 0.025 0.155 0.026 0.158
dialect 0.154 0.361 0.190 0.392 0.122 0.327
combmath 469.438 89.860 481.162 94.093 459.014 84.575
combread 480.244 91.115 461.358 95.926 497.037 83.090
combscie 491.497 97.081 497.471 102.266 486.186 91.908
combprob 474.505 92.385 475.324 98.990 473.777 86.089
regular1 0.139 0.346 0.187 0.390 0.096 0.295
regular2 0.817 0.387 0.779 0.415 0.850 0.357
regular 3 0.044 0.206 0.034 0.182 0.053 0.225
failed 0.109 0.311 0.150 0.358 0.071 0.258
histedaggr1 0.284 0.451 0.268 0.443 0.299 0.458
histedaggr2 0.364 0.481 0.344 0.475 0.382 0.486
histedaggr3 0.352 0.477 0.388 0.487 0.319 0.466
mhist 0.233 0.423 0.241 0.428 0.226 0.418
intact 0.791 0.407 0.790 0.408 0.791 0.406
hisei 47.093 16.695 47.387 16.926 46.831 16.485
housewife 0.365 0.482 0.349 0.477 0.381 0.486
books1 0.247 0.431 0.265 0.442 0.231 0.422
books2 0.526 0.499 0.501 0.500 0.549 0.498
books3 0.213 0.409 0.217 0.412 0.210 0.407
type1 0.246 0.430 0.282 0.450 0.213 0.410
type2 0.346 0.476 0.415 0.493 0.284 0.451
type3 0.409 0.492 0.303 0.459 0.503 0.500
N 11181 5322 5859
44Table A.2b - Descriptive Statistics PISA sample - Germany
full sample male female
variable name wgh.mean sd wgh.mean sd wgh.mean sd
female 0.517 0.500
age 15.769 0.283 15.777 0.279 15.762 0.287
foreign 0.080 0.271 0.079 0.270 0.081 0.273
dialect 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
combmath 520.639 91.320 528.516 93.047 513.733 88.665
combread 512.201 91.839 493.870 94.774 529.689 85.358
combscie 522.689 96.135 529.274 98.336 517.124 93.173
combprob 528.354 85.206 527.696 87.817 529.371 82.272
regular1 0.135 0.342 0.157 0.364 0.115 0.319
regular2 0.612 0.487 0.618 0.486 0.280 0.449
regular 3 0.252 0.434 0.224 0.417 0.280 0.449
failed 0.126 0.332 0.138 0.345 0.114 0.318
histedaggr1 0.135 0.342 0.144 0.351 0.127 0.333
histedaggr2 0.437 0.496 0.408 0.492 0.465 0.499
histedaggr3 0.428 0.495 0.449 0.497 0.408 0.492
mhist 0.172 0.377 0.179 0.383 0.165 0.371
intact 0.754 0.431 0.766 0.424 0.744 0.437
hisei 50.041 16.219 50.260 16.341 49.906 16.078
housewife 0.204 0.403 0.200 0.400 0.208 0.406
books1 0.176 0.381 0.195 0.396 0.156 0.363
books2 0.505 0.500 0.503 0.500 0.507 0.500
books3 0.311 0.463 0.293 0.455 0.329 0.470
type1 0.302 0.459 0.351 0.477 0.253 0.435
type2 0.359 0.480 0.350 0.477 0.370 0.483
type3 0.339 0.474 0.299 0.458 0.377 0.485
N 3840 1831 1974
45Table A.3a: Choice of Secondary School Track: Complete Results - Male
Italy Germany
Basic (5517) Richer (5322) Basic (2018) Richer (1831)
Log-lik= -4761.34 Log-lik= -4152.97 Log-lik= -1545.99 Log-lik= -1268.07
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Technical
age 0.073 0.171 0.015 0.180 -0.067 0.264 0.299 0.305
foreign -0.741 0.322 0.836 0.328
dialect -0.488 0.230
combmath 0.012 0.002 0.006 0.002 0.013 0.002 0.003 0.003
combread 0.003 0.001 0.008 0.002
combscie 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.002
combprob 0.003 0.002 0.005 0.003
regular1 -0.366 0.649 0.476 0.373
regular2 -0.176 0.629 0.119 0.274
failed -0.058 0.199 0.146 0.206
histedaggr2 0.132 0.151 -0.019 0.153 -0.196 0.216 -0.365 0.239
histedaggr3 0.435 0.174 0.255 0.168 -0.282 0.230 -0.863 0.263
mhist 0.160 0.133 0.063 0.138 -0.205 0.151 -0.396 0.170
intact 0.441 0.120 0.119 0.177
hisei 0.007 0.005 0.024 0.006
housewife 0.192 0.165 0.195 0.204
books2 -0.048 0.135 0.060 0.183
books3 0.037 0.182 0.755 0.250
constant -6.550 2.823 -5.824 3.073 -4.888 4.174 -13.455 5.298
Academic
age 0.349 0.221 0.268 0.249 -0.932 0.330 -0.403 0.455
foreign -0.852 0.500 1.340 0.593
dialect -0.882 0.278
combmath 0.021 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.035 0.002 0.017 0.004
combread 0.008 0.002 0.022 0.003
combscie 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.003
combprob 0.008 0.002 0.004 0.005
regular1 -1.940 0.682 1.379 0.521
regular2 -0.768 0.611 0.502 0.339
failed -0.111 0.337 -0.511 0.382
histedaggr2 1.190 0.215 0.495 0.239 0.110 0.339 0.069 0.421
histedaggr3 2.440 0.231 1.203 0.235 1.074 0.339 0.251 0.446
mhist 0.587 0.151 0.377 0.165 0.385 0.207 0.069 0.240
intact 0.569 0.195 0.245 0.224
hisei 0.046 0.006 0.052 0.007
housewife 0.367 0.192 0.311 0.277
books2 0.611 0.171 0.094 0.326
books3 0.927 0.232 1.054 0.374
constant -17.226 3.682 -17.769 4.198 -5.287 5.056 -19.917 7.452
46Table A.3b: Choice of Secondary School Track: Complete Results - Female
Italy Germany
Basic (5973) Richer (5859) Basic (2140) Richer (1974)
Log-lik= -5574.72 Log-lik= -5189.93 Log-lik= -1691.2 Log-lik= -1430.98
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Technical
age -0.033 0.248 -0.211 0.251 -0.350 0.261 -0.336 0.330
foreign 0.507 0.348 0.933 0.388
dialect 0.019 0.288
combmath 0.007 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.011 0.002 0.004 0.003
combread 0.004 0.002 0.007 0.002
combscie 0.002 0.001 -0.001 0.003
combprob 0.000 0.002 0.004 0.003
regular1 -0.688 0.579 -0.014 0.378
regular2 -0.241 0.501 -0.211 0.241
failed 0.431 0.236 0.517 0.250
histedaggr2 0.200 0.160 0.427 0.149 0.100 0.187 -0.120 0.222
histedaggr3 0.206 0.190 0.540 0.192 0.420 0.206 -0.106 0.223
mhist -0.109 0.156 0.089 0.164 0.145 0.171 0.063 0.196
intact 0.156 0.170 0.161 0.176
hisei -0.002 0.006 0.017 0.005
housewife 0.504 0.173 0.066 0.196
books2 -0.349 0.143 0.264 0.198
books3 -0.672 0.238 0.560 0.267
constant -2.214 3.794 -0.551 4.040 0.250 4.125 -2.047 5.528
Academic
age 0.194 0.214 -0.005 0.220 -0.923 0.294 -0.044 0.462
foreign 0.079 0.454 1.367 0.453
dialect -0.087 0.391
combmath 0.011 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.031 0.002 0.017 0.003
combread 0.009 0.002 0.024 0.003
combscie 0.002 0.001 -0.003 0.003
combprob -0.001 0.002 0.003 0.004
regular1 -1.414 0.542 1.550 0.514
regular2 -0.425 0.429 0.746 0.305
failed 0.381 0.273 -0.268 0.373
histedaggr2 0.981 0.167 0.780 0.148 0.718 0.310 0.313 0.355
histedaggr3 1.668 0.203 1.172 0.182 1.973 0.324 0.905 0.369
mhist 0.282 0.143 0.394 0.157 0.571 0.220 0.381 0.255
intact 0.095 0.159 0.315 0.228
hisei 0.016 0.006 0.047 0.008
housewife 0.402 0.168 -0.289 0.260
books2 0.247 0.175 -0.103 0.282
books3 0.493 0.258 0.324 0.346
constant -8.169 3.296 -6.562 3.610 -2.509 4.627 -23.984 7.853









age 0.001 -0.036 0.038 0.016
[0.039] [0.041] [0.028] [0.029]
ability(mathematics) 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0
[0.000]** [0.000] [0.000]** [0.000]
attending technical school 0.239 0.22 0.077 0.077
[0.038]** [0.040]** [0.035]* [0.033]*
attending high school 0.667 0.628 0.465 0.435
[0.024]** [0.029]** [0.035]** [0.035]**
highest education in the couple (secondary) 0.131 0.073 0.079 0.02
[0.035]** [0.034]* [0.020]** [0.023]
highest education in the couple (tertiary) 0.222 0.116 0.158 0.052
[0.032]** [0.035]** [0.021]** [0.027]
mother is highest in education -0.062 -0.045 -0.026 -0.002
[0.026]* [0.028] [0.020] [0.019]






ability(problem solving) 0 0
[0.000] [0.000]
earlier in age of enrolment -0.264 -0.34
[0.074]** [0.071]**




intact family -0.011 0.021
[0.029] [0.023]
socio-economic index (highest in the couple) 0.003 0.003
[0.001]** [0.001]**
26-200 books at home 0.051 0.086
[0.030] [0.018]**
more than 200 books at home 0.166 0.159
[0.038]** [0.020]**
Observations 5341 5168 5866 5759
PseudoR-squared 0.33 0.35 0.26 0.29
Loglikelihood -2488.11 -2314.41 -2736.95 -2565.82









age 0 0 0.074 0.028
[0.054] [0.081] [0.046] [0.065]
ability(mathematics) 0.001 0 0.001 -0.001
[0.000] [0.001] [0.000]** [0.000]
attending technical school 0.141 0.083 -0.041 -0.086
[0.058]* [0.071] [0.073] [0.080]
attending high school 0.295 0.23 0.174 0.123
[0.057]** [0.073]** [0.068]* [0.077]
highest education in the couple (secondary) -0.033 -0.08 -0.021 0.042
[0.061] [0.074] [0.069] [0.075]
highest education in the couple (tertiary) 0.161 0.056 0.142 0.139
[0.057]** [0.074] [0.072]* [0.076]
mother is highest in education -0.034 0.004 0.078 0.083
[0.034] [0.039] [0.041] [0.041]*






ability(problem solving) -0.002 -0.001
[0.001]** [0.001]*
earlier in age of enrolment 0.048 -0.035
[0.100] [0.078]




intact family -0.059 0.026
[0.042] [0.034]
socio-economic index (highest in the couple) 0.001 0.002
[0.001] [0.001]*
26-200 books at home -0.012 -0.045
[0.071] [0.055]
more than 200 books at home 0.088 -0.025
[0.073] [0.055]
Observations 1094 1012 1356 1279
PseudoR-squared 0.11 0.16 0.12 0.17
Loglikelihood -654.07 -575.97 -784.59 -699.73
49Table A.5: De￿nition of Variables in ISTAT sample
De￿nition Variable Name
Dependent Variable:
Never Enrolled in University Never Enrolled
Drop-out from University Drop-out
Enrolled after 3 years or Completed Enrolled
Highest schooling parents: Primary parhistschd1
Highest schooling parents: Secondary parhistschd2
Highest schooling parents: Tertiary parhistschd3
Mother highest schooling level mhistsch
Father work fatwork
Not employed fatworkjoblvld1
Blue collar - low fatworkjoblvld2
Blue collar - high fatworkjoblvld3
White collar - low fatworkjoblvld4
White collar - high fatworkjoblvld5








Lower Secondary grade: low votomedd1
Lower Secondary grade: medium votomedd2
Lower Secondary grade: good votomedd3
Lower Secondary grade: very good votomedd4
Lower secondary and High School grades:
low and low overallgraded1
low and medium overallgraded2
low and good overallgraded3
low and very good overallgraded4
medium and low overallgraded5
medium and medium overallgraded6
medium and good overallgraded7
medium and very good overallgraded8
good and low overallgraded9
good and medium overallgraded10
good and good overallgraded11
good and very good overallgraded12
very good and low overallgraded13
very good and medium overallgraded14
very good and good overallgraded15
very good and very good overallgraded16
Failed at least once in secondary school secfailed
Secondary school: vocational trackd1
Secondary school: technical trackd2
Secondary school: academic trackd3 50Table A.6: Descriptive Statistics of ISTAT sample
Male (mean) Female (mean)
Basic Richer Basic Richer
Never enrolled 0.6503 0.6501 0.5567 0.5568
Drop-out 0.0580 0.0579 0.0525 0.0530
Enrolled 0.2918 0.2921 0.3908 0.3903
parhistschd1 0.5278 0.5295 0.5649 0.5637
parhistschd2 0.3820 0.3800 0.3504 0.3509
parhistschd3 0.0902 0.0905 0.0847 0.0854









macroregd1 0.2120 0.2129 0.2430 0.2384
macroregd2 0.1412 0.1417 0.1647 0.1645
macroregd3 0.2123 0.2134 0.1805 0.1842
macroregd4 0.2866 0.2834 0.2470 0.2494























trackd1 0.4450 0.4458 0.4395 0.4426
trackd2 0.4233 0.4241 0.3558 0.3563
trackd3 0.1318 0.1301 0.2047 0.2011
N 9956 10453 11527 12343
51Table A.7a: Sequential Logit - ISTAT - Male
Basic Richer
coef st err coef st err coef st err coef st err
￿rst choice (￿
0s):
const -2.1027 0.1384 -2.2438 0.1689 -2.2202 0.2326 -2.5541 0.2428
parhistschd2 0.9232 0.0522 0.6909 0.0552 0.7728 0.0559 0.5687 0.0596
parhistschd3 2.3308 0.0961 1.6194 0.1061 1.9353 0.1031 1.2842 0.1145
mhistsch 0.2320 0.0573 0.1612 0.0603 0.184 0.0585 0.1121 0.0621
fatwork 0.1080 0.1174 0.0179 0.1564
fatworkjob 2 -0.1094 0.1292 -0.0998 0.135
fatworkjob 3 -0.1601 0.1228 -0.2114 0.1286
fatworkjob 4 0.272 0.1213 0.1559 0.1275
fatworkjob 5 0.5307 0.1301 0.2705 0.1377
brothsist -0.3066 0.0699 -0.2055 0.0749
mothousewife -0.2495 0.052 -0.2061 0.0553
macroregd2 -0.1083 0.0817 -0.0778 0.0874 -0.1523 0.0815 -0.1442 0.0874
macroregd3 -0.0927 0.0732 -0.0420 0.0786 -0.101 0.0732 -0.0594 0.0785
macroregd4 0.0438 0.0683 0.0635 0.0727 0.1868 0.0703 0.2022 0.0751
macroregd5 -0.0961 0.0823 -0.0390 0.0863 0.0418 0.084 0.0798 0.0884
single 0.4136 0.1798 0.3894 0.1839
trackd2 0.6867 0.0560 0.8338 0.0572
trackd3 2.7956 0.1120 3.1577 0.1151
Ability:
H.S. grade Yes Yes No No
Overallgrade No No Yes Yes
secfailed -0.3431 0.0569 -0.4337 0.0608
second choice (￿0s):
const 1.2119 0.2869 1.0682 0.2915 0.7859 0.4543 0.5828 0.4602
parhistschd2 0.2964 0.1019 0.1846 0.1035 0.2527 0.1103 0.1533 0.1117
parhistschd3 1.0347 0.1652 0.6627 0.1735 0.9872 0.1861 0.6332 0.1913
mhistsch -0.0944 0.1121 -0.1208 0.1132 -0.0703 0.1131 -0.0947 0.1148
fatwork -0.2140 0.2479 -0.2692 0.2491
fatworkjob 2 -0.2987 0.2687 -0.3027 0.2705
fatworkjob 3 -0.28 0.2566 -0.2716 0.2583
fatworkjob 4 -0.1305 0.2528 -0.1671 0.2547
fatworkjob 5 -0.103 0.2673 -0.231 0.2693
brothsist 0.159 0.1256 0.2239 0.1276
mothousewife -0.0836 0.1005 -0.0353 0.1022
macroregd2 0.1838 0.1662 0.2298 0.1680 0.1252 0.1626 0.1612 0.1651
macroregd3 -0.1417 0.1405 -0.1176 0.1418 -0.1456 0.1389 -0.1145 0.141
macroregd4 0.0973 0.1346 0.1245 0.1356 0.1069 0.1364 0.1418 0.1384
macroregd5 -0.2807 0.1545 -0.2326 0.1557 -0.2911 0.1565 -0.2606 0.1581
single 0.231 0.3415 0.096 0.3446
trackd2 0.3477 0.1096 0.4114 0.1099
trackd3 1.1326 0.1604 1.4283 0.1648
Ability:
H.S. grade Yes Yes No No
Overallgrade No No Yes Yes
secfailed -0.2757 0.1112 -0.3276 0.1126
Loglik -6707.97 -6269.49 -6813.91 -6270.32
N 9956 10453
52Table A.7b: Sequential Logit - ISTAT - Female
Basic Richer
coef st err coef st err coef st err coef st err
￿rst choice (￿
0s):
const -1.8132 0.1141 -1.9626 0.1206 -2.2985 0.1664 -2.4686 0.1740
parhistschd2 0.9330 0.0463 0.6935 0.0493 0.7482 0.0483 0.5612 0.0514
parhistschd3 2.4834 0.1052 1.7665 0.1134 1.9860 0.1053 1.4111 0.1139
mhistsch 0.2947 0.0512 0.1939 0.0539 0.2876 0.0511 0.2068 0.0540
fatwork 0.0696 0.0936 0.0183 0.0978
fatworkjob 2 -0.1191 0.1023 -0.0824 0.1073
fatworkjob 3 -0.0682 0.0957 -0.0597 0.1003
fatworkjob 4 0.3215 0.0958 0.2541 0.1007
fatworkjob 5 0.6827 0.1065 0.4975 0.1125
brothsist -0.3484 0.0624 -0.2738 0.0668
mothousewife -0.2286 0.0449 -0.1922 0.0475
macroregd2 -0.1677 0.0678 -0.0259 0.0723 -0.1675 0.0672 -0.0554 0.0716
macroregd3 0.0990 0.0654 0.2094 0.0698 0.0830 0.0646 0.1685 0.0692
macroregd4 0.2433 0.0606 0.3780 0.0641 0.4156 0.0614 0.5398 0.0651
macroregd5 -0.0362 0.0687 0.0954 0.0720 0.1540 0.0691 0.2665 0.0731
single 0.8015 0.1068 0.6232 0.1085
trackd2 0.4891 0.0488 0.5252 0.0486
trackd3 2.3491 0.0804 2.4969 0.0812
const 1.0131 0.2332 0.9814 0.2404 0.4002 0.3255 0.3668 0.3301
Ability:
H.S. grade Yes Yes No No
Overallgrade No No Yes Yes
secfailed -0.3590 0.0585 -0.4199 0.0616
second choice (￿0s):
parhistschd2 0.1541 0.0956 0.0105 0.0981 0.1040 0.0999 -0.0118 0.1002
parhistschd3 0.9845 0.1734 0.5363 0.1810 0.9922 0.1853 0.5966 0.1893
mhistsch 0.2898 0.1010 0.2327 0.1022 0.3090 0.0997 0.2636 0.1009
fatwork 0.1567 0.1920 0.1314 0.1934
fatworkjob 2 0.1284 0.2176 0.1487 0.2192
fatworkjob 3 0.0966 0.2006 0.1097 0.2019
fatworkjob 4 0.1798 0.1971 0.1352 0.1985
fatworkjob 5 0.2156 0.2138 0.1137 0.2153
brothsist -0.2167 0.1266 -0.1558 0.1280
mothousewife 0.0144 0.0903 0.0308 0.0925
macroregd2 0.0140 0.1517 0.0805 0.1501 0.0148 0.1433 0.0561 0.1454
macroregd3 -0.2346 0.1326 -0.1940 0.1337 -0.2212 0.1289 -0.2084 0.1307
macroregd4 0.1027 0.1301 0.2022 0.1306 0.1679 0.1284 0.2529 0.1296
macroregd5 -0.2573 0.1412 -0.1749 0.1421 -0.1605 0.1399 -0.0996 0.1412
single 0.7647 0.2028 0.6492 0.2048
trackd2 0.0464 0.1015 0.0684 0.0984
trackd3 1.1086 0.1419 1.2009 0.1391
Ability:
H.S. grade Yes Yes No No
Overallgrade No No Yes Yes
secfailed -0.1465 0.1223 -0.1641 0.1234
Loglik -8351.27 -7782.37 -8731.71 -8094.68
N 11527 12343
53Table A.8a: Multinomial Logit - ISTAT - Male
Basic Richer
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Drop-out:
parhistschd2 0.6976 0.0957 0.5727 0.0973 0.5645 0.1009 0.4594 0.1024
parhistschd3 1.4614 0.1728 1.0879 0.1805 1.0980 0.1859 0.7853 0.1919
mhistsch 0.2997 0.1075 0.2636 0.1079 0.2185 0.1071 0.1905 0.1077
fatwork 0.2662 0.2319 0.2212 0.2324
fatworkjob 2 0.1561 0.2480 0.1509 0.2487
fatworkjob 3 0.0569 0.2383 0.0209 0.2390
fatworkjob 4 0.3724 0.2356 0.3087 0.2366
fatworkjob 5 0.6176 0.2490 0.4813 0.2504
brothsist -0.4388 0.1184 -0.3816 0.1194
mothousewife -0.2055 0.0937 -0.1762 0.0942
macroregd2 -0.2214 0.1570 -0.2059 0.1577 -0.2141 0.1530 -0.2088 0.1538
macroregd3 0.0151 0.1321 0.0382 0.1328 0.0258 0.1301 0.0469 0.1310
macroregd4 -0.0301 0.1273 -0.0340 0.1280 0.1161 0.1289 0.1099 0.1297
macroregd5 0.1451 0.1432 0.1412 0.1440 0.2885 0.1444 0.2756 0.1452
single 0.1168 0.2934 0.1340 0.2942
trackd2 0.4514 0.1003 0.5229 0.0994
trackd3 1.8563 0.1776 1.9875 0.1794
cons. -3.5735 0.2687 -3.6584 0.2708 -3.2411 0.4036 -3.4420 0.4073
Ability:
H.S. grade Yes Yes No No
Overallgrade No No Yes Yes
secfailed -0.1314 0.0994 -0.1910 0.1003
Enrolled:
parhistschd2 0.9855 0.0567 0.7287 0.0601 0.8316 0.0608 0.6055 0.0654
parhistschd3 2.4993 0.0993 1.7383 0.1102 2.1035 0.1076 1.4051 0.1206
mhistsch 0.2152 0.0611 0.1335 0.0646 0.1739 0.0627 0.0873 0.0671
fatwork 0.0683 0.1268 -0.0381 0.1311
fatworkjob 2 -0.1838 0.1403 -0.1762 0.1476
fatworkjob 3 -0.2191 0.1328 -0.2814 0.1401
fatworkjob 4 0.2447 0.1306 0.1085 0.1384
fatworkjob 5 0.5068 0.1398 0.2076 0.1491
brothsist -0.2691 0.0753 -0.1490 0.0815
mothousewife -0.2603 0.0561 -0.2164 0.0601
macroregd2 -0.0812 0.0876 -0.0438 0.0938 -0.1382 0.0873 -0.1264 0.0945
macroregd3 -0.1210 0.0790 -0.0665 0.0845 -0.1351 0.0789 -0.0926 0.0854
macroregd4 0.0620 0.0733 0.0895 0.0780 0.2041 0.0754 0.2286 0.0812
macroregd5 -0.1675 0.0897 -0.0966 0.0939 -0.0361 0.0917 0.0123 0.0970
single 0.5212 0.2057 0.4917 0.2114
trackd2 0.7654 0.0625 0.9391 0.0640
trackd3 2.9745 0.1153 3.4255 0.1200
cons. -2.3758 0.1495 -2.5412 0.1567 -2.6553 0.2608 -3.0556 0.2739
Ability:
H.S. grade Yes Yes No No
Overallgrade No No Yes Yes
secfailed -0.4073 0.0629 -0.5167 0.0679
N 9956 10453
Loglik -6707.41 -6270.86 -6812.41 -6269.72
54Table A.8b: Multinomial Logit - ISTAT - Female
Basic Richer
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Drop-out:
parhistschd2 0.7803 0.0940 0.6751 0.0952 0.6552 0.0964 0.5781 0.0972
parhistschd3 1.5894 0.1905 1.2817 0.1965 1.1219 0.1960 0.9052 0.1998
mhistsch 0.0507 0.0996 0.0086 0.1000 0.0420 0.0977 0.0101 0.0982
fatwork -0.0700 0.1845 -0.0889 0.1849
fatworkjob 2 -0.2366 0.2067 -0.2152 0.2073
fatworkjob 3 -0.1699 0.1910 -0.1745 0.1915
fatworkjob 4 0.1564 0.1890 0.1255 0.1897
fatworkjob 5 0.4716 0.2067 0.3933 0.2076
brothsist -0.1719 0.1253 -0.1388 0.1260
mothousewife -0.2084 0.0892 -0.1896 0.0896
macroregd2 -0.1822 0.1443 -0.1018 0.1451 -0.1704 0.1394 -0.1113 0.1401
macroregd3 0.2922 0.1288 0.3532 0.1295 0.2638 0.1253 0.3201 0.1261
macroregd4 0.1605 0.1268 0.2006 0.1274 0.2630 0.1257 0.3017 0.1264
macroregd5 0.1935 0.1356 0.2420 0.1363 0.2980 0.1350 0.3419 0.1357
single 0.0951 0.1769 0.0409 0.1773
trackd2 0.4820 0.0971 0.4614 0.0940
trackd3 1.3670 0.1506 1.4144 0.1479
const -3.0909 0.2244 -3.2400 0.2281 -3.0189 0.3064 -3.1804 0.3098
Ability:
H.S. grade Yes Yes No No
Overallgrade No No Yes Yes
secfailed -0.2339 0.1143 -0.2888 0.1149
Enrolled:
parhistschd2 0.9585 0.0484 0.6971 0.0519 0.7637 0.0506 0.5575 0.0542
parhistschd3 2.5937 0.1067 1.8383 0.1156 2.0962 0.1075 1.4913 0.1169
mhistsch 0.3366 0.0536 0.2316 0.0568 0.3315 0.0536 0.2489 0.0570
fatwork 0.0951 0.0983 0.0407 0.1028
fatworkjob 2 -0.0974 0.1080 -0.0551 0.1141
fatworkjob 3 -0.0498 0.1010 -0.0360 0.1067
fatworkjob 4 0.3514 0.1008 0.2809 0.1069
fatworkjob 5 0.7217 0.1116 0.5209 0.1189
brothsist -0.3785 0.0648 -0.3009 0.0698
mothousewife -0.2314 0.0470 -0.1923 0.0501
macroregd2 -0.1660 0.0708 -0.0116 0.0762 -0.1669 0.0702 -0.0437 0.0755
macroregd3 0.0632 0.0685 0.1775 0.0736 0.0499 0.0676 0.1345 0.0731
macroregd4 0.2549 0.0630 0.4098 0.0671 0.4409 0.0639 0.5859 0.0684
macroregd5 -0.0804 0.0718 0.0648 0.0762 0.1258 0.0727 0.2500 0.0774
single 0.9936 0.1203 0.7982 0.1229
trackd2 0.4924 0.0521 0.5403 0.0519
trackd3 2.4587 0.0819 2.6367 0.0832
const -2.0948 0.1202 -2.2568 0.1277 -2.7559 0.1809 -2.9467 0.1903
Ability:
H.S. grade Yes Yes No No
Overallgrade No No Yes Yes
secfailed -0.3854 0.0627 -0.4500 0.0664
Loglik -8350.55 -7780.80 -8728.85 -8090.60
N 11527 12343
55Table A.9: Descriptive Statistics GSOEP Sample
Male (Means) Female (Means)
Dependent Var:
Enrolled University 0.343 0.365
Enrolled Vocational 0.585 0.588
















other degree 0.032 0.066
N 373 425
56Table A.10a: Multinomial Logit - GSOEP - Male
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Enrolled University:
age 0.2943 0.0937 0.2319 0.1033
single 0.1102 0.6065 -0.2222 0.6428
parents: academic -0.1969 0.6068 -0.6114 0.7014
parents: technical 0.6156 0.7077 0.3767 0.7883
grademath=1 2.2935 0.7574 2.3311 0.7701
grademath=2 1.0761 0.5733 1.2548 0.5929
grademath=3 1.6600 0.7119 1.8236 0.7209
track: Realschule -2.7900 1.1760
track: Abitur 0.1370 0.9006
track: Other -0.8413 1.2189
cons -6.9058 2.4741 -4.7417 2.8456
Enrolled Vocational:
age 0.1347 0.0918 0.2473 0.1027
single 0.3373 0.5878 0.3543 0.6390
parents: academic -2.0166 0.5791 -1.5315 0.6628
parents: technical 0.3592 0.6647 0.5239 0.7419
grademath=1 0.5235 0.7658 0.6345 0.8125
grademath=2 0.6226 0.5371 0.3428 0.5771
grademath=3 1.8833 0.6737 1.7070 0.7054
track: Realschule 1.0470 0.9347
track: Abitur -0.9074 0.8903
track: Other -1.4802 1.2414
cons -1.5005 2.3800 -4.2992 2.8237
Loglik -266.45 -202.43
N 373 373
57Table A.10b: Multinomial Logit - GSOEP - Female
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Enrolled University:
age 0.2484 0.0943 0.1753 0.1025
single 1.6828 0.5307 1.1915 0.6072
parents: academic 0.9838 0.6143 0.0457 0.6900
parents: technical 0.9191 0.6344 0.4590 0.6919
grademath=1 0.4901 0.9664 1.1041 1.0651
grademath=2 -0.5467 0.7196 -0.1730 0.7801
grademath=3 -0.1545 0.7958 0.3047 0.8577
track: Realschule -18.9672 2.7454
track: Abitur -15.5036 2.7923
track: Other -18.0230 2.7509
cons -5.5383 2.5129 13.3529
Enrolled Vocational:
age 0.1000 0.0914 0.0931 0.0984
single 1.5200 0.5080 0.8958 0.5790
parents: academic -1.1549 0.5937 -1.4786 0.6681
parents: technical 0.1773 0.5932 -0.2116 0.6532
grademath=1 -0.5803 0.9757 0.1378 1.0645
grademath=2 -0.4736 0.7045 -0.0015 0.7448
grademath=3 0.3939 0.7753 0.8228 0.8205
track: Realschule -16.7331 2.7593
track: Abitur -16.6701 2.8276
track: Other -19.4397 2.7861
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Figure 1: Kernel density estimates of the distribution of mathematical and
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Figure 2: Kernel density estimates of the distribution of mathematical and
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Figure 3: Density Estimation of the Distribution of Marginal E⁄ects of at least
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Figure 4: Counterfactual Marginal E⁄ects of at least one Parent with College
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Figure 5: Counterfactual Marginal E⁄ects of at least one Parent with College
on the Academic Track Choice by Combined Score in Mathematical Test
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